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ABSTRACT  
 
 With the accessibility of air travel, infectious diseases such as SARS, MERS, Avian 
Influenza, and Ebola have become extremely mobile. Although severe acute respiratory 
syndrome (SARS) originated in China, it wasn't diagnosed there. Chinese-American 
businessman Johnny Chen was diagnosed on his arrival to Vietnam from China in February 
2003, spurring the WHO to issue an unprecedented global alert. An acute and mysterious 
respiratory disease was ravaging Vietnam. Dr. Carlo Urbani, the doctor who first diagnosed 
SARS, leveraged the cultural logics in Vietnam to mobilize the European Union, the WHO, and 
the communist government into action with such rapidity that Vietnam stayed ahead of the 
curve, and was the first country to eradicate SARS. From the perspective of critical medical 
anthropology (Singer 2016), utilizing a theory of cultural logics (Enfield 2000), and Foucaldian 
biopower (1982), I explore Vietnam’s embedded cultural traits and the interaction between the 
state and the population “the conduct of conduct” (Rabinow, Foucault 1984:18) through the 
Ministry of Health and the central government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam during the 
pandemic outbreak. Vietnam is a case-study in disease containment; the first country – as a 
developing nation – to control a mass contagion in the contemporary age. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Research Questions and Context 
 SARS shook the world. By some standards, the first emerging and readily transmittable 
disease of the 21st century was not a big killer, but it caused great fear and social disruption (WHO 
2006:vii). In this thesis, I analyze the social aspect of infectious disease, which is often ignored, 
or is only assessed or reviewed after a serious health event. To do this, I use the lens of critical 
medical anthropology (CMA) which Singer (2015) describes as the intertwined biological, 
environmental, social, and cultural worlds in which infectious diseases are set. I address three 
central questions: (1) What cultural logics were leveraged in Vietnam’s SARS outbreak? (2) How 
did the WHO global network and WHO Country Representative Dr. Carlo Urbani influence 
Vietnam’s SARS response? (3) In what ways does an analysis of Vietnam’s SARS response 
highlight the importance of the sociocultural and biopolitical aspects of infectious disease? I 
outline how participants recall making sense of, and responding to the SARS pandemic, within a 
communist political context and in light of Vietnam’s political history. 
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) originated in China. In November of 2002, 
reports surfaced in the media of a rare pneumonia outbreak in southern China. A 45-year-old man 
in Foshan City, Guangdong, became ill with fever and respiratory symptoms, and passed on the 
infection to four relatives. He was retrospectively identified as the first SARS case (Xu 
2004:1030). China’s closed system of reporting led to a growth period for the as yet unnamed 
virus. It spread throughout Guangdong province. Doctors from the mainland and Hong Kong made 
frequent visits to the area to address the mysterious killer contagion.  The Chinese government 
attempted to contain information on SARS, even though news reports were making their way to 
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the outside world. The government control of information demonstrates an important biopolitical 
aspect to the SARS pandemic that requires critical analysis. I argue here that state control of 
information proved to be important in the development and migration of SARS. This aspect to the 
disease is rarely accounted for within the biomedical realm. Government control exists outside the 
framework of the doctor, lab, patient axis, but is no less important in the progression of infectious 
diseases, and ultimately disease control. 
 In China, many people complained of a government cover-up. Media silence only 
encouraged the criticism to flourish, and in the case of SARS, it exploded onto the world stage 
despite the Chinese government’s efforts to hide it (Fong 2006:533). The WHO sent a team to 
China to investigate how to work with the Chinese government to get accurate reporting of the 
situation. As the New Year of 2003 approached, deaths rates rose. The WHO made repeated 
requests for transparency, based on increased news reporting of deaths and local pandemonium 
related to SARS. 
 The WHO (2006:76-77) described the lack of media coverage and suspected 
underreporting in China at a critical juncture in the rise of the SARS pandemic: 
The disease was barely covered by the media, creating a fertile environment for the 
spread of rumors. Chinese journalists say they were dissuaded. At a press 
conference on 11 February, Guangdong health authorities announced that the 
outbreak of atypical pneumonia had started on 16 November 2002 and had affected 
305 people, only five of whom had died. Then they quickly focused attention on 
the National People’s Congress in Beijing in March, where a new president, 
premier, and Government would be chosen. Outsiders found the information that 
was filtering out of China hard to believe. They feared the outbreak was far worse. 
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Assistants at a Chinese medicine shop prepare traditional medicines for clients 
worried about the SARS virus. The media turned to the WHO office for information 
that the Ministry of Health and Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention 
(China CDC) were unable or unwilling to provide. By the first week after the initial 
report on 10 February, the local media had identified the WHO office as a potential 
source of information on the new disease. It appeared that the potential spread of a 
new and deadly disease was of great concern to their readers and listeners. 
Panic broke out. Local residents stocked up on medicines and food in preparation for the worst. 
The Lo Wu border (Hong Kong) is directly south of the Luo Hu border (Shenzhen). This is the 
busiest foot traffic crossing in the world. One-hundred million people move through this area each 
year. It is therefore a mega-conduit of human foot traffic from the most populous nation in the 
world, to one of the busiest air travel hubs. An infectious disease in Guangdong province benefits 
from a constant flow of people to Hong Kong for daily shopping and holiday visits to the former 
British colony. SARS proved to be no exception. It migrated from mainland China’s Guangdong 
province to the global hub of Hong Kong. From there, air travel out of Hong Kong took SARS 
global. 
 On February 21, 2003, a Chinese doctor who unknowingly carried the disease visited Hong 
Kong. SARS spread to other travelers who then spread it throughout the world (Fong 2007:532). 
The WHO (2006) reported that at least four hotel guests on the doctor’s floor were infected through 
the air conditioning system. Two days later, one of those infected travelers – Chinese-American 
businessman Johnny Chen – arrived in Vietnam.  
SARS first gained attention outside of China in March 2003, when Dr. Carlo Urbani, a 
WHO official based in Vietnam, reported several cases of “atypical pneumonia” at the hospital 
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where he worked (Mendoza 2012:1). After months of mysterious deaths in China, SARS appeared 
in Vietnam. Johnny Chen was first diagnosed at the privately-owned Hanoi French Hospital after 
doctors and nurses recognized something was very strange with a patient afflicted with an atypical 
influenza. They immediately called in the WHO’s resident doctor to bring global expertise to the 
fore in a very dangerous situation. The hospital staff and Vietnamese foreign-trained doctors along 
with French clinicians responded immediately. Their actions precipitated an unprecedented global 
alert that began with Dr. Carlo Urbani’s key diagnosis. With close connection to the global 
healthcare systems of the WHO, Vietnam is an open and transparent country that strives to 
integrate with the rest of the world. Vietnam’s response to the atypical pneumonia was one of 
solidarity and international cooperation. The biopolitical positioning of Vietnam as an open and 
cooperative nation is a key feature in the global narrative of SARS. 
 Vietnam’s society was shaped under one-thousand years of Chinese rule, a millennium that 
plagued Chinese regimes with countless village-linked rebellions and regime expulsions. 
Interlaced among the struggles against Chinese rule were attacks from the  Mongols, striking a 
weakened Vietnam after the expulsion of protracted Chinese regimes. France’s colonialization of 
Vietnam spanned a century, followed by decades of the American occupation of southern Vietnam. 
Fending off all foreign invasion culminated in the American War (1955-1975), and the push West 
through Chinese-backed Cambodia to topple the Pol Pot regime in 1979. With that, colonialism 
was officially over in Vietnam, a communist country that earned the ire of its neighboring 
countries. Vietnam was forced to deal with the biopolitics of isolation. 
 Isolationist policies and defaulted reparations after the American War devastated the 
Vietnamese economy. The country endured a decade of starvation and great national need, as it 
was left to grapple with taking care of its own people. As a result, in 1986, Vietnamese leaders 
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initiated the doi moi era, a national interest in renewal and openness to cooperation with foreign 
governments. The city of Hanoi, the same city that stood resilient against Chinese, Japanese, 
French and American encroachment, adopted a new moniker for the coming millennium, “Thanh 
Pho Hoa Binh” (City of Peace). A history of isolation from the outside world tempered a city and 
a nation that, to compensate and ‘catch up’, aggressively sought – and continues to seek – foreign 
assistance and expertise.  
Vietnam’s early containment of the SARS virus is a case study on the impact of society’s 
cultural logics and biopolitics on global pandemics. As Enfield (2000:36) states, cultural logics 
exist among individuals in a group, referring to what is mutually known by those who share a local 
environment and/or a common heritage. Further, cultural logics are dynamic, and exist in the 
everyday, similar assumptions people make in interpreting each other’s actions. On the other hand, 
as Taylor (1990:139) states, biopolitics, involves governmental decisions made in response to 
prevailing health of its citizens. Both concepts emerge clearly in an anthropological analysis of 
SARS in Vietnam. This is important because Vietnam was the first country to diagnose the SARS 
epidemic for the danger that it was. On April 28th, 2003, Vietnam was also the first country to be 
removed from the World Health Organization’s (WHO) list of SARS-affected countries (Le 
2003:265). This was accomplished by Vietnam in the face of this millennium’s first global 
pandemic. By July 5, 2003, when WHO declared the outbreak over, it had received reports of 
8,439 cases and 812 deaths from 32 countries and areas (WHO 2006:185). 
 Sociocultural and biopolitical dimensions were major factors in the SARS pandemic. These 
include the suppression of information about the SARS outbreak in China, and the movement of 
air travelers into Hong Kong and around the world. Colonialism, war, and isolation in Vietnam 
gave rise to the cultural logics of solidarity and resilience. These logics influenced Vietnam’s 
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successful containment of the epidemic. Vietnamese recollections of the response to the SARS 
pandemic highlight the importance of sociocultural and biopolitical aspects that shaped the path, 
and ultimately the containment of SARS. Singer’s (2016:225) assertions of the importance of 
cultural origins of disease are therein confirmed. 
 In this research, I explore the ways in which people in Vietnam recall and explain the 
events of the SARS pandemic, and the extent to which various aspects of Vietnam’s 
sociopolitical history informs those explanations and recollections.  I explore the cultural logics 
at play during the SARS pandemic, drawing upon the responses of Vietnamese doctors and 
nurses as well as staff from the Ministry of Health and media participants who found themselves 
at the heart of the outbreak. These cultural logics developed generationally through Vietnam’s 
history to influence the way participants conducted themselves during the outbreak, and how 
they responded during research interviews. I also examine if and how Dr Urbani, as a 
galvanizing figure in the SARS pandemic, figures into health community’s explanations and 
recollections of the fight during the installation of the disease protocols. Finally, by focusing on 
the sociocultural and biopolitical dimensions of SARS, I identify the ways in which this study 
contributes to health-related ethnography of Vietnam and Southeast Asia. There has yet to be an 
ethnographic study of the SARS outbreak in Vietnam, a developing nation that at the time had 
limited technological advancements in healthcare, but benefitted from its national effort at global 
integration since 1986’s doi moi. This thesis offers an ethnographic account of how residents of 
Hanoi recall the SARS outbreak, framing it in terms of war, an us-them dichotomy, and 
Vietnamese solidarity.  
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1.2 Theoretical Framework 
1.2.1 Critical Medical Anthropology 
 I adopt a critical medical anthropological (CMA) analytical framework to explore the 
sociocultural and the biopolitical aspects of the SARS pandemic in Vietnam. Critical medical 
anthropology dates to the mid-1980s when the sociocultural and the biopolitical dynamics of 
disease were increasingly addressed.  Medical anthropologists such as Merrill Singer and Hans 
Baer emphasized the social and political dimensions of disease as a way to problematize the 
representations of ill-health as a primarily natural phenomenon.  As CMA developed over the 
decades, the broad political focus has narrowed to pertain almost exclusively to inequities at the 
community and national levels. In my research, I am using CMA to guide my analysis of how 
Vietnam’s political history and current political structure influenced the SARS epidemic in Hanoi. 
Singer (2016) argues that social and cultural origins of infectious disease are of comparable 
importance to biological pathogenesis. In Singer’s (2016) view, infectious agents such as bacteria, 
viruses, and helminths are the necessary and immediate causes of infection. But who gets infected, 
under what conditions, and with what health and social outcomes are culturally constructed and 
politically determined. Infectious diseases, therefore, involve far more than biology. 
If we are truly suspended in Geertz’s (1973:5) webs of significance that we ourselves have 
spun, then these webs of culture and politics are important determinants of health-related issues. 
Baer (1997:1567) states that CMA allows us to account for those webs by examining how illness 
unfolds in different sociocultural settings. As Leatherman and Goodman (2011:29) state, the 
question is not whether health is more biological or more cultural, but how health processes emerge 
and intersect as part of the “biocultural dance”. Human health and wellbeing is biocultural. 
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Infectious disease, and all responses to it, therefore, must be understood beyond biological givens. 
Political, cultural and social factors mediate and shape the impact of, and the fight against 
infectious agents on humans in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. In this light, I use CMA to draw 
out several levels of analysis with regard to how Vietnam’s social and political history impacted 
the SARS epidemic in Hanoi: Vietnam’s socialist-oriented biopolitics; its stratified political levels 
in society; and its long history of colonialism. A critical medical anthropological theoretical 
framing will establish the connection of global health-related issues with political and social order. 
 My analysis of the biopolitics of SARS in Vietnam is informed by the Foucaldian view of 
biopower. The communist state enacts the “conduct of conduct” (Foucault, Rabinow 1984:18) and 
this is illustrated during the SARS outbreak. As I will argue later in my thesis with specific 
examples, participant interviews revealed a high respect for, and adherence to government 
protocols for healthcare workers and patients. There was a palpable solidarity with decisions from 
Vietnam’s Ministry of Health and among the private Hanoi French Hospital healthcare workers 
who diagnosed the arrival of the atypical pneumonia. Both public and private hospitals have a 
different level of accountability to the communist government of Vietnam. Public hospitals are 
most closely controlled by the government, while private hospitals have a level of autonomy, 
coupled with the added dimensions of foreign expertise and global connections. Ultimately, both 
public and private hospitals must adhere to the central government directives during times of crisis. 
The Vietnamese government was lauded for its governing over the conduct of both public and 
private hospitals during the fight against SARS. 
 In summary, critical medical anthropology takes into account how disease is shaped by 
underlying social and political forces. CMA is therefore an appropriate lens to assess the meaning 
of Socialist Republic of Vietnam’s accomplishment as the first nation to contain SARS. Following 
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Singer, Baer, and Newman (1995, 2016), this framework will allow me to focus on the micro-
experience of the individual, within the context of macrostructures that influence political and 
social life in Vietnam’s successful response to the SARS pandemic. 
1.2.2 Cultural Logics 
 Cultural logics are collectively held principles that ‘make sense’ to community members 
as a framing of, and foundation for solutions to issues and problems that arise. They are resources 
that guide reasoning, explanation, and problem-solving. Using cultural logics as an analytical tool 
throughout this analysis sheds light on how and why the Vietnamese people responded to the 
pandemic the way they did, and highlights key aspects of the successful response in Vietnam. 
Cultural logics reflect the prevailing communist political climate and protracted colonialist and 
warring history of Vietnam. Cultural logics also reveal how these macro-level forces play out in 
the everyday lives of Vietnamese citizens. A focus on cultural logics, therefore, contextualizes the 
way in which healthcare workers and the government address the mysterious and dangerous viral 
threat of SARS.  
Enfield (2000) suggests that the process of people collectively using similar assumptions 
in interpreting each other’s actions, that is hypothesizing as to each other’s motivations and 
intentions – may be termed cultural logic. Fischer (1999) defines cultural logics as generative 
principles realized through cognitive schemas that promote intersubjective understanding. These 
logics are conditioned by the unique contingencies of life histories and structural positions in 
political-economic systems. Vietnam has endured three thousand years of war, and I argue this has 
fostered a unique set of cultural logics within its subset as a human group. 
 The history of Vietnamese people cooperating to survive, from collective rice cultivation 
to fending off three-thousand years of foreign invasion, has galvanized unity in Vietnam. As 
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Kirmayer states (2018:84-5), exploring cultural meanings requires attention to overarching 
discourse, embodied practices, and everyday engagements with an ecosocial environment; a shared 
and predictable social world. Enfield (2000:35) describes cultural logics as a process of 
establishing conceptual convention where people collectively use similar assumptions to intervene 
and redirect the course of events during crisis. I argue that in an exclusively biomedical response, 
the cultural logics of non-biomedical practitioners are largely ignored. Critical medical 
anthropology, on the other hand, allows us to link human biology and health to social, cultural and 
political-economic dynamics. Foucault’s (1982) notion of biopower is relevant here. Biopower is 
a force that disciplines, shapes, and redefines individuals through the state’s health apparatus. 
Responses to newly identified pandemics require navigating uncharted territory, but it is territory 
that is defined, and in a large part, controlled by those wielding biopower. It is in this context that 
cultural logics emerge. 
 Vietnam’s cultural logics are shaped by the country’s tumultuous history of war. The rigors 
of war and rebellion yield cultural logics of solidarity, resistance and cooperation. Solidarity is 
seen as an internal “solution” to foreign aggression and encroachment. These logics were recalled 
during the SARS pandemic, and came to the fore with the virus cast as a contemporary foreign 
invader. This fight is a primary cultural logic, an ideal that ‘makes sense’ as framing of, and a 
solution to all foreign entities – including viruses – trying to enter Vietnam.  
 Isolation during and after the American War stymied socioeconomic development on all 
fronts in Vietnam. Resources were diverted to the fight against foreign aggression. However, the 
long history of resistance to foreign invaders is not only a history of conflict. Vietnam consistently 
seeks to cooperate with other nations as well as global systems of governance.  Vietnam’s history 
yields a contemporary Asian society receptive to outside influence, a galvanized sense of 
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solidarity, and an internal innovative drive that is open to foreign cooperation. Hanoi, for example, 
is well-connected globally through a bustling expatriate community of diplomatic missions and 
foreign corporate and global aide institutions such as the World, Bank, the United Nations and the 
WHO. The cultural logics of solidarity and cooperation play significant roles in Vietnam’s 
response to SARS. I argue that these critical sociocultural aspects of Vietnamese society are 
essentially ignored in a biomedical analysis of the response to the SARS pandemic. 
1.2.3 Biopower 
 The SARS outbreak was first diagnosed in the private Hanoi French Hospital (HFH). As 
government involvement increased, patients were required to follow disease protocols established 
at the nearby Bach Mai public hospital under the authority of the Ministry of Health. Government 
control over the population of Vietnam was a critical component to containing the SARS epidemic. 
The state influences the population through public health programming such that citizens become 
healthy subjects of the state. This is biopower in action. The direct result of biopower is the 
increased role of government in patient health, disease containment toward mediating public 
health, and government control and power over international containment through border control 
and global alerts. Foucault (Rabinow 1984) refers to biopower as the art of government, exercised 
through biopolitical control of health and other institutions. The biopolitical landscape in Vietnam 
shifted as the Vietnamese politburo – the seat of government and power in Vietnam – was 
convinced of the dangers of SARS. Reports from the HFH, followed by Dr. Carlo Urbani’s 
presentation of the disease to the Ministry of Health brought SARS to the forefront of the political 
agenda. Something had to be done.  
Control and containment were the immediate response. Douglas (1966) contends that when 
a community experiences itself as threatened, it will respond by expanding the number of social 
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controls regulating the group's boundaries. Protocols were put in place at the HFH which was at 
the center of the disease outbreak, along with patients, the public, and at borders and air terminals.  
This initial response changed the course of events in Vietnam, and Carlo Urbani played a 
key role in establishing those controls. After being called in from the WHO to the HFH, Urbani 
quickly realized that the progression of the contagious disease was inordinately rapid in the index 
patient and healthcare workers who attended to him. Urbani reported to his superiors immediately 
that “something was terribly wrong” (Fahlman, Urbani, Scialdone 2003). The HFH and Urbani set 
up quarantine zones in the hospital. Urbani alerted the European Union nations in Hanoi, who 
pressed for a meeting with Vietnam’s Ministry of Health. With the Vietnamese government 
convinced, his actions set into course a chain of events that closed the HFH and locked down the 
country. Through the WHO network, Urbani’s alert set off warnings that united the response 
globally. Knobler (2004:7-8) explains: 
Responding to Dr. Urbani’s alert and other reports of atypical pneumonia in 
Vietnam and Hong Kong, WHO sent GOARN [WHO Global Outbreak Alert 
Response Network] teams to Hong Kong and Hanoi to join investigative and 
containment efforts already underway. The early detection of SARS in Vietnam, 
prompt sharing of that information with the international community, and 
aggressive containment efforts by the Vietnamese government, in partnership with 
a GOARN team, enabled the Vietnamese to eradicate SARS by the end of April. 
This was accomplished before SARS was contained in either Canada or Singapore, 
despite Vietnam’s comparatively limited healthcare resources and lower education 
levels among its population. 
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Urbani died from SARS on March 29, 2003 in Bangkok, Thailand. He was posthumously 
awarded the Socialist Republic of Vietnam’s highest honors for a foreign national: The Gold 
Medal of Friendship, and the Award for Public Health.  
 1.2.4 War 
Vietnam has been at peace since 1979. Vietnamese sovereignty emerged after Chinese, 
Japanese, French and American occupation and the subsequent wars toward independence.  War 
is part of the historical conscience of Vietnam. Streets, parks and monuments throughout the 
country bear the names of past war heroes and generals. Vietnamese politicians, themselves 
victors of the War against America, use icons of past battles to remind Vietnamese citizens of 
this history. Repeatedly glorifying the icons of past battles in all of Vietnam’s cultural and 
political ceremonies emboldens the communist party’s ethos of solidarity. Just as Enfield (2000) 
describes, the public maintenance of a system of assumptions and counter assumptions among 
individuals about what is mutually experienced provides human groups with common premises 
for predictably convergent inferential processes. Solidarity in the face of adversity and 
perseverance in the face of invasion are cultural values that become leveraged as cultural logics 
during the SARS outbreak. Almost all of the participants made reference to war and solidarity 
with the fellow workers in their interviews, and I will pick up on these themes to argue their 
prevalence in Vietnam’s cultural logics later in the thesis. 
 Given its military history, it is not surprising that war figures so prominently in the 
descriptions of SARS in Vietnam.  After a decade of US occupation ending on April 30, 1975, the 
Vietnamese army moved east to the Cambodian capital of Phnom Pen, concerned with Chinese 
involvement with the Pol Pott government. They advanced West through the jungles of Cambodia 
and defeated the Chinese-backed Khmer Rouge after reaching Phnom Pen. The Chinese 
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government was deeply angered by this demonstration of Vietnamese aggression. China launched 
a limited attack on Vietnam’s northern border. China held fast to newly claimed northern border 
land in protest of Vietnam’s removal of the Khmer Rouge. A “fight” mentality was clearly 
prevalent in Vietnam at that time. So much so that large militias of non-military, including many 
women were formed in the absence of the Vietnamese army occupied in Cambodia. Female author 
and Vietnamese war hero Duong Thu Huong was one of the leaders of the women’s militia against 
the Chinese. The Chinese retreated, ripping up the railroad track that they had navigated to enter 
Vietnam, and destroying towns in their wake. Vietnamese troops remained in Phnom Pen for a 
decade until 1989, and any advancement of the Chinese troops in an invasion of Vietnam went 
quietly unrealized. 
Three-thousand years of war have left a deep imprint on Vietnam. This is documented in 
major war museums and it is evident in the conversations of families, some of which were torn 
apart by the conflict between the North and the South. However, as the country was sewn back 
together by a single-party leadership and a people’s steely resistance to colonial powers, a 
cultural logic of resistance to foreign invasion took root. 
After three thousand years of conflict, it was the Socialist Republic of Vietnam’s single-
party communist rule that led the country out of war. The communist party of Vietnam has named 
the capital city of Hanoi, the City of Peace (Thanh Pho Hoa Binh). Although Vietnam is a united 
nation now enjoying a time of peace, the cultural logics of resistance to foreign invasion, solidarity, 
innovation, and earnest global cooperation persist. These are the logics that were leveraged in 
response to the SARS outbreak. 
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1.2.5 Us versus Them 
 Fischer (1999:488) agrees that cultural resistance rests on a sense of solidarity in opposition 
to an opposing force. This gives rise to a dichotomy between “Us” versus “Them”. This is a key 
logic in the Vietnamese response to SARS. In this case, SARS is the other. As I will discuss in 
more detail later in the thesis, this metaphor was referenced by the participants in several 
interviews. One of the participants discussed Vietnamese lore, the bamboo thicket that surrounds 
the entrance and perimeter of the traditional village. This demarcation divides those outside the 
village from those inside; the metaphorical “Us” from “Them”. The village is the defining unit of 
society, a nation shaped and unified by the collective labour of wet rice cultivation. Vietnamese 
communities are linked together not only through their shared history of war but also through their 
subsistence labour and village life. The bamboo thicket at the entrance of the village is not easily 
traversed; the barrier that defines “Us” inside. Villagers inside the thicket cooperate in communal 
food production and protection. Much as Vietnamese history dictates, the fight against and 
resistance to those outside the thicket, or “Them”, is a deeply engrained cultural logic that pervades 
society. 
 As I will discuss later in the thesis, the theme of “Us” versus “Them” was prevalent 
throughout participant interviews, and is a key cultural logic that figured in the fight against the 
SARS pandemic as it entered from outside Vietnam. Fischer explains (1999:474), that any given 
cultural logic is realized through practice, the dynamic interaction of individual intention.  A 
cultural logic is an amalgam of cultural norms variably enforced through reflexive social 
interaction, encompassing structural positions in global systems of political economy. SARS 
crossed the bamboo thicket barrier to create chaos and confusion in the early stages of the 
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pandemic; a metaphoric intruder within their midst, rearing the well-founded resolve of the 
Vietnamese people.  
1.2.6 Solidarity 
 In Chapter two, I will discuss how participant interviews revealed that the cultural logic of 
solidarity figured in Vietnam’s response to SARS. Gaztambide-Fernández (2012:46) argues that 
solidarity refers to unifying social relations between individuals as well as groups. Solidarity is 
used in reference to a vast range of social phenomena, from social cohesion to social movements, 
from political to civic organization, from religious duty to ethnic obligation. The cultural logic of 
solidarity refers to strong social cohesion among Vietnamese. As participants stated, this may be 
due in part to prolonged wars, causing people to band together in times of resistance. One can 
resist alone, but it is the perpetuation of resistance through the group that promotes unification. 
 Solidarity among the Vietnamese people is noticeable in day-to-day living in Vietnam. In 
March of 2000, when I first arrived to Hanoi from Canada, I took a motorbike taxi on one of my 
first mornings as a fresh intern arriving at my new post. When I went to pay the taxi, he required 
change to reconcile the Vietnamese đồng note I had handed him. To my surprise, he turned to a 
complete stranger in the street, who noticed me immediately as the rich foreign client. I was 
Fischer’s (1999:488) the “Other". The complete stranger quickly provided the required change. 
Only later, after conferring with locals at my new work place did I realize the two had quickly 
conspired, having never met, to ensure that I was moderately overcharged. A harmless lesson, but 
a quick lesson on the palpable solidarity of Vietnamese in their daily lives. 
As Gaztambide-Fernández (2012:46) states, solidarity hinges on similarities in 
characteristics, political interests, social needs, or moral obligations. It is clear from the 
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participant interviews that the HFH staff exhibited similar social needs and moral obligations 
during the outbreak. They believed that all must stay together and all must continue the fight. 
 
 In the microcosm of the hospital, the traditional Asian hierarchy, or honorifics (Sir, Uncle, 
Aunt, Older Brother, Older Sister) are used as a sign of respect for elders and those in higher 
position did not diminish this solidarity. As I will discuss later in this thesis, participant interviews 
revealed that all worked together to protect public health and serve patients regardless of their 
position at the hospital, or status as an elder during the lockdown. Conversely, outside of the 
hospital, the hierarchies of the political party, the military, the police, and the stratification of 
society in general remained firmly intact and played a very important role in patient tracing. This 
stratification of society was routinely discussed by participants at the interviews; it has been a way 
of life in Vietnam in the communist era, and provided a lattice on which to build accurate patient 
tracing, quarantine and isolation during the early days of the pandemic. 
 Outside the hospitals, the solidarity that ties Vietnamese citizens together meant that they 
followed national directives to protect public health during the outbreak. This commitment to 
solidarity developed from decades of national directives guiding citizens during military action 
and in response to sirens that signaled incoming air raids. Vietnamese citizens are unified in 
following national directives for the protection of public good as well as individual survival. There 
is a national pride in full compliance as a civic duty. SARS containment provided evidence of this. 
Solidarity played a major role in the galvanization of the Vietnamese healthcare workers at the 
HFH hospital in the resiliency in the face of SARS. 
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1.3 Thesis Significance and Outline 
 There are few ethnographies of health in contemporary Vietnam. Some earlier analyses 
suffered from data limitations or interpretative biases (Chen 1994:1). Porter (2013:132) spent two 
years with rural families in Vietnam that raise chickens to understand the plight of farmers and 
government-led controls that prevails over livelihoods. She considers outbreaks of SARS, swine 
flu and avian influenza with a focus on “One Health” multispecies interactions. Efforts to address 
human health problems are increasingly rooted in understanding our links, not only to each other, 
but to other species as well. Montoya (2013) explores the collection, compilation and circulation 
of contested quantitative data within an emerging HIV/AIDS apparatus in Vietnam. His 
ethnography shows that in Vietnam, as in many places, biological and behavioral surveillance data 
are virtually always incomplete and contestable, even as such data have become an essential driver 
of funding and programming. McClelland (2004) did a comparative research analysis of public 
health strategies associated with the SARS response in several countries, including Vietnam. 
Specifically, I hope this thesis will contribute to setting the groundwork for future studies that 
could offer a comparison between the cultural logics of a pandemic response in two different 
political contexts: a single-party communist state with a socialist-based market economy and a 
democratic market-based economy. The results of this research will also contribute to the health 
ethnography of Vietnam. One particular significant contribution that this study may make is to 
present the understanding of Dr. Carlo Urbani as a galvanizing figure who tips the balance to urge 
the Vietnamese Ministry of Health into action against the SARS pandemic. 
 SARS is a highly infectious, acute, and atypical respiratory disease (Fahlman, Urbani, 
Scialdone 2003). After an alert from the HFH, the WHO’s Dr. Carlo Urbani’s attempted to 
diagnose and treat the disease. He quickly came to the realization that it was both unknown and 
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extremely dangerous. The WHO global network was alerted through his actions, and national 
mobilization was legislated in Vietnam. Solidarity in Vietnam forms the societal lattice that 
supported the rapid legislation of national mobilization of healthcare workers. Solidarity represents 
a deep respect for, and defense of, public good. By examining the outbreak and response from a 
critical-interpretive anthropological perspective, I identify the cultural logics and biopower 
apparatus in play in Vietnam. This study lays the ground work for the future incorporation of a 
developing nation’s leadership in the containment of infectious disease. 
In this introductory chapter, I have summarized the primary arguments of my thesis. Each 
theme derived from the data is given one numeric section for discussion. I also present research 
questions and a literature review of the theoretical approach to this thesis. My background and 
work in journalism during the outbreak, and over the ten years that I lived in Vietnam gave me a 
privileged perspective to the news wires. In April of 2003, I co-authored a novelette on Carlo 
Urbani posthumously, in accordance with the WHO, and the wishes of Urbani’s family and 
medical colleagues. 
 In Chapter Two, I discuss ethnographic methodology and the context in which I 
interviewed participants. I also begin to analyze the data in support of the most prominent themes. 
I have lived in Vietnam for eight years, and have worked in the country for a total of eighteen 
years. I have an intermediate level of understanding of the Vietnamese language and a comfortable 
understanding of Vietnamese culture. I also discuss the long history of war in Vietnam and its 
influence on the cooperation and solidarity of Vietnamese society. I then examine the cultural 
logics of Vietnam that were leveraged toward early containment of the SARS virus. Leatherman 
and Goodman’s (2011) “biocultural dance” between the pathological and biopolitical realities 
20 
 
parallels with the SARS virus in Vietnam’s communist context. The dancers need not be separated, 
but rather fully understood toward a complete story on the global SARS response. 
 Chapter Three takes this further with an analysis of the “Us” versus “Them” cultural logic. 
Vietnam’s tumultuous history impacts society, as does its communist government. I explore how 
this historical and political context informs the dichotomy between “Us” and “Them” that emerges 
in this research. Vietnam’s political and economic isolation after 1979 was pronounced and 
enduring, resulting in starvation and economic ruin. As a result, the value and appreciation of 
foreign expertise, the propagation of innovation, and the propensity to look outward are prominent 
in Vietnamese society. I also discuss how Vietnamese communism and solidarity unite in national 
mobilization and respect for foreign health expertise. I explore the “Us” versus “Them” dichotomy, 
a duality that is amplified in a Southeast Asian nation that was once shunned by most of the world. 
I employ the SARS chronology of events to reinforce the positives in Vietnam’s infectious disease 
response. Emphasis is put on the inseparability of social and political aspects with the biological 
reality of an infectious disease. As Singer (2015:58) states, the anthropology of infectious disease 
begins with the understanding that these conditions are at once pathological reality and social 
construction. 
 In Chapter Four, I explore the analysis of power as it pertains to the Foucaldian theme of 
biopower and biopolitics during the critical stages of the SARS pandemic. This is a dynamic 
analysis that ebbed and flowed through the Urbani diagnosis of the atypical virus, the immediate 
crisis of rapid death of healthcare workers, government involvement precipitated through the 
Ministry of Health, and the government’s control and penultimate lock down of the country that 
led to the WHO’s global health alerts. In each of these phases, power and thus biopower was 
impacted through the HFH and the WHO, and the influence of the state on the health of the 
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population. This is Foucault’s “conduct of conduct” (Rabinow, Foucault 1984:18), the state’s 
guidance of the population to maintain healthy bodies. 
 In the conclusion, I tie together the sociocultural and biopolitical aspects of the disease 
response in Vietnam. I endeavor to capture three vital facets of this research: (i) the major 
contributions of the research to existing literature in medical anthropology; (ii) the primary 
limitations of the research; and (iii) directions for future research. It is my hope that this 
ethnography takes us much further afield than just the epidemiological approach to SARS, and 
becomes part of the public record as so. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 METHODOLOGY AND SARS IN VIETNAM 
2.1 Ethnographic Context 
2.1.1 Vietnam 
 Vietnam is a modern-day Asian Tiger economy, meeting its United Nations Millennium 
Development Goals. The middle-class in Vietnam is growing at an exponential rate. A gregarious 
and efficient work force draws international investment and the tourism industry draws over fifteen 
million holidaymakers annually.  Some eighty percent of the population is dependent on 
agriculture for employment. In 2003, just prior to the SARS outbreak, tourism was burgeoning and 
economic indicators were strong. The country’s economy and tourism were brought to a 
screeching halt in March of 2003 when the WHO issued its unprecedented global alerts from 
Hanoi, Vietnam. The central government closed its border due to the SARS outbreak, sacrificing 
a positive economic environment due to a highly contagious and dangerous atypical influenza.  
 In March of 2000, I undertook a six-month internship to Vietnam with Saskatchewan 
Polytechnic, which led to work as a journalist at Vietnam Television’s English Department, and 
the Vietnam Daily Newspaper. In February of 2003, when SARS broke, I was employed at both 
news outlets, and had access to the newswires and colleagues who worked for the Italian 
Embassy as well as the WHO. Carlo Urbani was an infectious disease specialist with the WHO, 
the primary clinician who first diagnosed the atypical pneumonia. Immediately after his death, 
the Italian embassy and the WHO commissioned me to co-author a memorial novelette in his 
honor. I interviewed the UN Representative, the WHO Representative, and the Director of the 
Center for Tropical Diseases at the Bach Mai hospital in Vietnam as a part of the project. This 
gave me access to news media, diplomatic missions, ministerial contacts, and medical 
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professionals close to the outbreak. The Urbani novelette was the starting point for this thesis in 
medical anthropology, as it contains the story of Vietnam’s battle with the first major pandemic 
of the contemporary era.  
2.2 Methodology and Analysis 
 As Singer (2015:56) suggests, the methodological backbone of the anthropology of 
infectious disease is ethnography – the long-term observational and participatory field of study 
of people and issues in social and environmental context. I have lived and worked in Vietnam 
since March of 2000, and I continue to work there each year to date. For the purposes of this 
research, I conducted ten semi-structured interviews between October and March of 2015. 
Participants were at the heart of Vietnam’s SARS outbreak in 2003. They included healthcare 
workers from the Hanoi French Hospital, Vietnam’s Ministry of Health, communications staff at 
the United Nations (UN), Vietnam’s Oceanographic Institute as well as staff at the Vietnam 
Daily News and Vietnam Television. The recruitment criteria consisted of participants between 
the ages of twenty-five and sixty-five who lived in or near Hanoi during the SARS outbreak of 
February and March of 2003.  
I recruited participants through personal connections, posters at desired outlets 
(Appendix, page 78), and snowball sampling. Following Lecompte and Schensul (2010), the data 
collection process was guided by a "formative theory". I allowed the data to inform the process, 
responding to participant comments with follow up questions, and tailoring my analysis to the 
data. Thus, I spent a large volume of time categorizing data and forming themes to develop a 
theoretical approach. Using inductive, thematic analysis of the interview data, I analyzed: (1) the 
links between participants’ experiences and the societal and government forces acting upon 
them; (2) how Vietnam’s tumultuous history and sense of nationhood impacts cultural logics; (3) 
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the extent to which various aspects of Vietnam’s sociopolitical history informs participant’s 
explanations and recollections of the SARS epidemic; and (4) the ways in which Carlo Urbani 
fits into the narrative of the leveraging of cultural logics and SARS containment.  
An open-ended interview guide (Appendix, page 76) was used and interviews lasted an 
average of thirty minutes. Each interview was transcribed and thematically coded. I used a 
grounded-theoretical approach to induce meaning, and used open-ended questions to probe for 
meaningful narratives.  I analyzed concepts, connections, and participant word usage, identifying 
thematic commonalities and differences across the transcribed texts. I then chose the most 
repeated and meaningful themes to complete the research. Initially, I began with approximately 
30 codes from the analysis. “War”, “Solidarity”, “Biopower” and “Us” Versus “Them” were the 
four most prominent themes in terms of both frequency as well as narrative elaboration. 
“Biocommunications”, “biopolitics” and “societal hierarchy” emerged as important themes as 
well, but they played a more limited role in the research, and could be accommodated within a 
discussion of the four more prominent themes.   
 The fact that I speak intermediate Vietnamese and have lived and worked in Vietnam for 
nearly two decades helped to minimize the gap between the research participants and me. 
Because of the long period of time I spent in Vietnam, I remained cognizant of the fact that I 
must interpret the data in as unbiased fashion as possible, and to look back on the data through 
this lens. I did this by adjusting my questioning to appear naïve to the SARS outbreak while 
interviewing participants to try to allow each participant to “teach” me their version of events. 
People love to teach, so this worked quite well throughout the lines of questioning. Ultimately 90 
pages of transcribed interviews resulted. These were supplemented with my observational notes 
that documented the participants’ behavioral responses to questions as well as their general level 
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of engagement. I realize that this put me in a position of trust that may not have occurred with 
other researchers. Thematic analysis was the primary strategy used in this research. Participants 
situated themselves in the stories in telling ways. My guiding analytical question was: “What is it 
the person is trying to present by the way in which they are telling their version of the story?”  
 There was marked differences in interpretation of the SARS epidemic offered by the 
admittance staff, nurses and doctors at the fore of the outbreak, compared with the senior 
management of the hospital and the Ministry of Health. Stories tended to be more frontline in 
admittance and nursing, while the Ministry of Health and leaders of the Hanoi French Hospital 
were more broadly analytical in scope. For example, it was an admittance staff who related the 
most detailed story of the index patient’s mood of irritability, uncharacteristic of the occidental 
patients she saw most. Whereas the high level leader of the HFH spoke of SARS on an 
institutional level in reports to the Ministry of Health and the central government. There were 
differences in the level of authority, with senior management relating the macro structure 
influence on the crisis. Their recounting of the events of the SARS outbreak were much more 
broad based on an institutional level as an international battle against the pandemic. Admittance 
staff and nurses tended to relate the concerns of their department and the frontline, with patient 
concerns at the fore. All staff, regardless of their position in the institution, spoke of the 
solidarity of all members at the Hanoi French Hospital. Each related the coming together of the 
group to help fallen colleagues regardless of their position at the hospital. 
 Near the end of my research period, I had a chance to visit the Hong Kong-Guangdong 
province (Ho Lu) border crossing. Here, I conducted a video log of the border crossing, the 
busiest walkway crossing in the world, between mainland China and Hong Kong. It is at this site 
where the massive train system of mainland China meets at Ho Lu and connects with the trains 
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and buses of the Hong Kong transit system. The purpose of the video log was to capture the 
sheer immensity of the crossing and the massive movement of people each day. I spent four 
hours recording the walking traffic to and from mainland China and Hong Kong. The high 
concentration of people in the area suggests an equally high propensity for the spread of disease, 
especially as a bottle-neck conduit for infectious disease. Indeed, this area has attracted the 
attention of the WHO, because of the crowded and transient nature of the Ho Lu border crossing. 
Masses of people create the perfect vector with which to spread disease, and this is the pathway 
that delivered SARS from Guangdong Province to Hong Kong, and then on to Vietnam, and the 
rest of the world. As one of the largest air travel hubs in Asia, Hong Kong International Airport 
(HKIA) is an advantageous center for the intercontinental movement of infectious disease. SARS 
demonstrated that HKIA is a global transfer site for infectious disease (WHO 2006:86,151). 
2.4 Timeline 
 After receiving approval from the University of Saskatchewan Behavioral Research 
Ethics Board in September (Appendices), I traveled to Hanoi, Vietnam in early October of 2015. 
Once there, I conducted seven interviews, five of which were at the Hanoi French Hospital on 
October 27. I then returned to Hanoi in March of 2015, and conducted three more interviews for 
a total of ten interviews. In March of 2015, I began transcribing written versions from the 
recording. The transcription process was completed in March of 2016. I then completed my 
course load in April of 2016. I coded interviews by hand and completed the analysis by April of 
2017. I began writing in May of 2017 and have continued to December of 2018. I took part 
committee meetings with my advisors each year, with the last one in January of 2019, with plans 
for defense in March of 2019. 
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2.5 SARS in Vietnam 
2.5.1 History and Healthcare in Vietnam 
Vietnam’s agrarian and turbulent sociopolitical history informed participants’ 
explanations and recollections of the fight against the pandemic. Vietnamese people have a 
history of solidarity to unify and fight foreign intrusion. How were these cultural logics of 
solidarity and the fight for resistance shaped? Karnow (1983:99) explains the shaping of a nation 
versed in solidarity and resistance: 
Rice cultivation, which is dependent on the vagaries of weather and on complex 
systems of irrigation, requires cooperative labor. Vietnamese communities thus 
developed a strong collective spirit, and though autonomous, villages could be 
mobilized as a unified chain of separate links to fight foreign intruders. Their 
country’s frequent wars also infused into the Vietnamese a readiness to defend 
themselves, so that they evolved into a breed of warriors. Centuries later, during 
France’s war to preserve its hold on Indochina in the 1950s, the French 
sociologist Paul Mus warned against the “convenient notion” that Vietnamese 
peasants were a “passive mass, only interested in their daily bowl of rice, and 
terrorized into subversion by agents. Their commitment to nationhood had been 
forged long before”. 
 Several participants went into detail on the fact that Vietnam is a nation shaped and 
unified by farming families and villages and the collective labour of wet rice cultivation. One 
participant remarked, “We just stay together and work. Our customs and traditions are families 
close together, happiness together. But when we have a problem we have to stay together and 
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fight it.” Almost all of the farm work is done by hand, with many in Vietnam employed in the 
agrarian sector. In the past, Villages worked together to unify and resist foreign aggression. This 
is significant. Vietnam was built on the cooperation and hard work that yields harvests and 
survival. It is also built upon the unifying force of resilience to aggression. As was explained in 
interviews, repeated wars throughout history meant communities and laborers were counted upon 
to enlist and repel intruders. With this base of forged resistance, intruders into the country have 
all met the same fate. For generations, invaders have been repelled, engraining a deep sense of 
nationhood and solidarity. Fighting enemy intruders is central to Vietnamese history and 
nationalism. From the data collected from participant interviews, I argue that the SARS virus is a 
contemporary foreign intruder. The Vietnamese people, led by global healthcare workers and the 
government, united to fight the virus. This fight was, and is a cultural logic – an ideal that 
‘makes sense’ as framing of, and a solution to all entities trying to enter Vietnam. This parallels 
the Vietnamese Ministry of Health’s legislation of national mobilization of healthcare workers in 
response to the SARS outbreak. Under government directives, there was a regimented and 
unified response to protect the public, and reestablish public health. Vietnamese solidarity is an 
example of a health determinant in the fight against SARS. 
 The cultural logic of solidarity has its roots deep in Vietnam’s history. The Southeast 
Asian peninsula, which the French labeled Indochina, and which encompasses Vietnam, 
Cambodia and Laos, has been a battlefield for centuries (Karnow 1983:ix). The Chinese ruled 
Vietnam from 200 BC to 800 AD. Revolts against the Chinese were repeatedly successful. But 
these rebellions left Vietnam weakened to attack from Mongol invaders, first in 1257 and again 
in 1284 (Corfield 2008:16-17).  Vietnamese revolts were frequent during the one thousand years 
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of Chinese rule. Over the centuries, they [Vietnamese] would repeatedly challenge Chinese 
domination. And that hostility entered their historic consciousness (Karnow 1983:99-100).   
 The French colonized Vietnam in 1846 and held rule until their expulsion in 1954 at the 
battle of Dien Bien Phu. American intrusion began quietly in the years following French 
expulsion, to stem the southward flow of communism from China. The US ramped up military 
operations to thwart the perceived communist threat with the first troops arriving to Vietnam in 
1965. After a long and politically unpopular war, the US was expelled from Vietnam on April 
30th, 1975. Three thousand years of recorded history reveal that all attempts to intrude on 
Vietnam’s soil ultimately failed. Throughout this thesis, I argue that the coming of the SARS 
virus in Vietnam is perceived by society, the government and the healthcare community as 
another invader, destined to suffer the same fate of expulsion as all those invaders of the past. 
 Sovereignty came at a cost for the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Isolationist policies 
kept the Southeast Asian nation from joining global trade agreements and organizations to 
purvey its rich and abundant natural resources. I argue that this contracted isolationism is a driver 
behind Vietnam’s respect for, and eagerness to engage with international expertise. The 1980s 
ushered in a difficult era of poverty and famine. After millennia of isolation and fending off 
foreign aggressors, the Vietnamese government began the difficult transition of looking outward 
to join the global community. In doing so, Vietnam, as a communist country, took a bold step in 
1986. It undertook a process the government termed Doi Moi, a renovation of its economic 
policy into a socialist-based market economy. 
Vietnam also began decentralizing its healthcare system. It reduced subsidies to the 
healthcare system from the central government. Along with all sectors in the economy, 
Vietnam’s healthcare system undertook a dramatic transformation. Thirty years ago, it was 
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firmly controlled by the central government. But over time, the ability of the Ministry of Health 
to shape activities has diminished significantly due to the rapid growth of the private sector, the 
much larger role of out-of-pocket expenditures, and the ongoing process of fiscal 
decentralization (Adams 2005:2). Vietnam’s population is nearing 100 million in a country about 
half the size of Saskatchewan. An interesting aspect of pay-per-use healthcare in Vietnam is that 
in times of illness and suffering, Vietnamese people are very demanding of services for the cost. 
Interview participants went into great detail to describe Vietnamese patients as unruly and 
somehow entitled. They must not only pay bribes to doctors and admittance staff as in the public 
healthcare system, but also pay top dollar for basic health services in a private hospital. In a 
communist country, providing health services for money has quite predictable outcomes. It suits 
those that can afford the services, such as foreigners in Vietnam with access to health insurance. 
But for the majority of Vietnamese people, the costs are enormous to the point where they may 
never use a private healthcare provider. To say that this breeds an irritated and volatile patient 
within healthcare is an understatement. For all of the solidarity in Vietnam, it would seem that 
money contravenes this cultural logic, especially in times of illness and suffering.  
The 2003 SARS outbreak occurred in the midst of this transformation at the privately-
owned Hanoi French Hospital (HFH), in a healthcare system that Vietnam’s Ministry of Health 
(2012) calls, “a highly unregulated public-private mix”. There are four administrative levels in 
the public system: national, provincial/municipal, district, and commune or community level. 
The Provincial Health Bureau, under the Provincial People’s Committee, is responsible for 
overall administration of the provincial health system, including provincial services and the 
district, commune, and private services within the province (Ministry of Health, Vietnam 
2012:2). The HFH, where Vietnam’s SARS index case was diagnosed, is governed by the 
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Provincial Health Bureau. But during a crisis, and once the Health Ministry is aware, all 
directives would originate from the highest levels of the central government and the Ministry of 
Health.  
 It is in this biopolitical and socioeconomic climate that institutions like the HFH were 
formed, bringing in foreign expertise with a fee-for-use system. As participant interviews 
revealed, the HFH was the first private pay hospital in a predominantly socialist public 
healthcare system. The hospital is small in comparison to the larger public hospitals and is 
staffed with French doctors that bring in international expertise. It is a much coveted but 
expensive healthcare facility. Participants said that staff numbers are small and colleagues are 
close-knit. During the SARS outbreak, staff stated that solidarity rose as healthcare workers died. 
As the Deputy General Director had stated in his interview, the Vietnamese government closed 
the HFH and healthcare workers were not allowed to leave for fear of spreading the disease. 
Participants revealed in their interviews that they had responded quickly to SARS, and relied on 
each other throughout the enormity of the pandemic response.  
2.5.2 SARS and the WHO 
 SARS is an aggressive viral illness that is believed to have mutated after making the 
zoonotic jump from animals to humans. Zoonoses are infectious disease agents that successfully 
transfer from an animal population host to a human population host (Singer 2015:91). Two 
independent groups of researchers have now identified bats as a natural reservoir of 
coronaviruses from which the SARS viruses that infected humans and civets likely emerged 
(Normile 2005:2154). Himalayan palm civet cats are a wild delicacy in China, and the SARS 
corona virus (SARS-CoV) may have entered the human food chain from this vector. The 
common fruit bat, then, is the SARS virus reservoir in nature. And there it remains, being passed 
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as a disease between the bats and the civet cats. As wild delicacies become more fashionable 
worldwide, wet markets that sell rare animals flourish. This introduces more pathogens into the 
human system that can make the zoonotic jump to humans. In his definition of the parameters of 
zoonosis, Singer (2015:101) states an important consequence of these close relationships is that 
although microbes adapt biologically and behaviorally to the bodily conditions inside the species 
they inhabit, they also migrate, jumping to new species and adapting to somewhat different 
conditions within their new hosts. Researcher Rui Heng Xu (Xu 2004:1030) zeros in on the 
origin of the SARS-CoV: 
Cases apparently occurred independently in at least five different municipalities; 
early case-patients were more likely than later patients to report living near a 
produce market but not near a farm; and 9 (39%) of 23 early patients, including 6 
who lived or worked in Foshan, [China] were food handlers with probable animal 
contact. Seroprevalence of immunoglobulin (Ig) G antibody to SARS-CoV is 
substantially higher among traders of live animals (13.0%) in Guangzhou 
municipality than among healthy controls (1.2%), and the highest prevalence of 
antibody is among those who traded primarily masked palm civets.  
 
 From living in Vietnam, and according to the participant interviews, it is well known that 
the traditional practice of using wild animals for food and medicine is common in South Asia 
and Southeast Asia. SARS owes its global notoriety and mobility to the aforementioned 
zoonosis, and to droplets of human respiratory fluid, coupled with a symptomatic phase that 
looks no different than a common respiratory ailment. Healthcare workers that diagnosed the 
cold-and-flu-like disease would be unaware. The atypical pneumonia had a peculiar hallmark: 
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health care workers were being stricken at an alarming rate (Drazen 2003:319). Under the 
camouflage of the common cold or flu, SARS spread rapidly from patients to healthcare workers 
as they attempted to diagnose and treat unknowing virus carriers.  With a latency period of ten 
days, asymptomatic SARS-infected travelers could fly to the other side of the globe before 
becoming symptomatic. Even if air travelers or healthcare workers did manifest symptoms, the 
cough or fever could easily be attributed to the usual cold-and-flu-like symptoms expected 
during the winter months of the SARS outbreak (November of 2002 to February of 2003).   
 Human migration has been a key means for infectious disease transmission throughout 
recorded history. However, the volume, speed, and reach of travel today have accelerated the 
spread of infectious diseases (Health Canada 2003). The dramatic increase in worldwide 
movement of people is the driving force behind the globalization of disease (1994 Mann:xv). It 
seems as though the more humanity relies on technology, the faster we travel. This dramatically 
increases the mobility of infectious diseases. Analyzing global travel as a predictor of infectious 
disease surveillance is a key sociocultural component to the study of human health. Coupled with 
the increase in expansion of the human population, we may be poised to be dealing with zoonotic 
jumps and emergent infectious diseases in the near future. Indeed, this is what we see happening, 
with the emergence of Middle East Respiratory Syndrome. Singer (2015:174) states that the first 
appearance of an emergent corona virus was reported in Saudi Arabia, and is associated with 
severe acute infection of the lungs and resultant breathing problems. In this case, the use of 
camels for transport allowed MERS to make the zoonotic jump to humans. This kind mutation 
and zoonotic jump to humans is a serious concern.    
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2.5.3 War and Solidarity in Vietnam 
Interview participants at the Hanoi French Hospital, when recalling the battle against the 
SARS virus in Vietnam, repeatedly referenced war and solidarity. Within the interviews, phrases 
such as, “It was like a war”, “joining the battle”, “fallen comrades”, or “continuing the fight”, 
were common. Three thousand years of colonialism and conflict suggest Vietnam has embedded 
cultural logics linked to war. The Art of War (Sun Tzu 1971), a translation of ancient Chinese 
military texts from the fifth century BCE, links culture and war. War is underpinned by cultural 
differences, pitting one political force against the other. These texts have survived and been 
revered for millennia, simple but direct analysis on how to exploit the culture of the enemy 
toward victory. As Garro (2000) states, by participating in social and cultural groups, individuals 
develop an active tendency to notice, retain and construct meaning and mutual understanding 
specifically along certain directions. Renowned Vietnamese scholar Hữu Ngọc (29:2016) states 
that the Vietnamese identity has been forged through a tradition of resistance to foreign 
aggression. This theme leads Hữu Ngọc to conclude that modern Vietnamese can be defined as 
members of the Việt ethnic community who resisted becoming Chinese under nearly one-
thousand years of Chinese colonial rule. As explained by multiple participants, repeated conflict 
is part of Vietnam’s history. Indeed, several participants made reference to the fact that the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam owes its sovereignty to its ability to withstand repeated conflict. 
They discussed that most families have a connection to the American war. I argue that solidarity, 
resilience, and innovation are a part of the nation’s historical conscience. Key examples of this 
solidarity are evident in the language used in participant interviews. The doctor in charge of the 
general ward and the index patient when he arrived stayed at the HFH from the first evening to 
the end of the outbreak, well over a month’s time. She put her version of solidarity in explicit 
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terms. She stated, “A lot of staff, a lot of doctors and non-medical staff became nurses’ assistants 
for the first time ever. There was a professor of orthopedics, he did not know about treatment or 
management [of SARS patients] so he helped us to bring food, clothes and provided bed side 
assistance for patients. Neurologists, surgeons, engineers, other specialists and non-medical staff 
became nurses’ assistants.” This is the same doctor who when asked to describe the beginning of 
the outbreak stated, “It was like a war.” 
Sun Tzu’s ancient texts point out that solidarity within the army is critical to the 
exploitation of enemy weakness. I reference these texts to argue that war is underpinned by 
culture; humankind relies on similarities to organize into groups. Military leaders in Vietnam 
rely on a similar ethos of solidarity, and have done so throughout millennia of tumultuous 
colonialism and war. I argue that Vietnam is a nation of counter-colonial strategists, with history, 
and their resulting sovereignty, as the penultimate proof of their success in repelling intruders.  
As noted by Collins and Malesevic (Malesevic 2011), war is a highly complex, 
historically contingent and socially embedded process that requires organizational and 
ideological reinforcement. Thus, the expression of war exhibits the hallmark cultural 
components, as in Tzu’s ancient texts, that develop and reinforce solidarity in Vietnam. As 
Keegan suggests (Malesevic 1991), war is an expression of culture with occurrences and 
character determined by different ethno-cultural, national, and civilizational traditions. Malesevic 
(2011:146) and Collins (2010) argue that the link among war, nationalism, and social cohesion 
constitute a kind of homogeneity that functions as solidarity. Thus war is built on the lattice of 
learned behaviors and their similarity, and more importantly, war can erupt between divergent 
human groups. Individual agents make rational choices to exploit shared cultural markers and in 
the process, foster the creation of intense national solidarity. In Vietnam, nationalism and intense 
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group solidarity, once the product of kinship, evolve further out of prolonged intergroup 
confrontation.  
 In direct relation to war, Nairn (Malesevic 2011) notes that to maintain solidarity, the  
Vietnamese communist party “invites the masses into history”. They do so by selecting war 
heroes from historic battles and making them national icons. Vietnamese have a reverent 
relationship with their dead war heroes. They are worshipped at temples and dominate street, 
park, and city names throughout the country. These icons of past conflict are reflected back to 
society, embedding and reinforcing solidarity. For example, after expulsion of the southern 
regime and the American army from the south of Vietnam in 1975, the name of its most 
populous city was changed from Sai Gon to Ho Chi Minh City. Bac Ho Chi Minh (Uncle Ho Chi 
Minh) was the heralded socialist leader that led the country tirelessly through the war years. Ho 
passed away in 1969 before the end of the American War. The memory of Ho’s passing inspired 
the Vietnamese military, in the name of its ultimate icon, to complete the expulsion of the 
American military from Vietnamese soil. His image is the symbol of a united Vietnam today, 
present at all communist meetings, city halls and socialist institutions throughout the country.  
Malesevic (2011:147-8) advances the idea that external threats impact social cohesion, 
suggesting a neo-Durkhemian approach that social cohesion and solidarity are ‘cemented’ by 
collective representation and commemoration of past wars. Nationalism operates as a civil 
religion that entails periodic worships of totemic and sacrificial symbols, normalizing them 
within society. The commemorations of ‘glorious dead’ set up moral parameters for the behavior 
of future generations. In the process, these behaviors perpetuate a strong national bond grounded 
in ethical responsibility towards ancestors. It is through the rituals and practices of collective 
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remembering of national martyrs that nationhood is maintained and national solidarity 
reinforced.  
The Communist party of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam is renowned for its 
propaganda art and military songs. These cultural artifacts rally the troops, reinforce its 
victorious past, and unite society under the monikers of glory and single-party leadership. 
Propaganda art has enjoyed a resurgence among Vietnamese youth as vintage art. The flag of the 
Communist party of Vietnam is the hammer and sickle, a symbol of brotherhood among 
communist nations. Art is an abstract expression of cultural traits, an anchor to Vietnam’s 
warring past and communist government. One of these anchored traits, is Vietnam’s strong vein 
of solidarity. Throughout their history, solidarity forms part of a cultural logics that makes sense, 
and to which Vietnamese society returns to, in dealing with modern day challenges. At the center 
of the art’s influence on cultural ethno-social solidarity, the Communist Party of Vietnam 
occupies a central role in all areas of government, politics, and society.  
The Socialist Republic of Vietnam is a single-party state, one of just five remaining, 
including China, Cuba, Laos, and North Korea. Celebrating the glories of past military victories 
is an important sociocultural aspect of the Party. Political organizations not affiliated with the 
communist party are not allowed to take part in elections in Vietnam, thus the Communist Party 
has unilateral control of the country. This control is stratified down through state hierarchy and 
into the ministries, wards and communes in each city and province. Vietnamese society is also 
stratified, at the workplace, in the community, and in the family. Hierarchy is a cultural trait that 
is respected nationwide. Not respecting this hierarchy is seen as rude and, for the most part, the 
hierarchy is maintained regardless of stature or wealth. It follows, then that when instructions are 
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given from the Vietnamese Politburo, they followed without exception by the citizens, police and 
the military in Vietnam.  
Repeated foreign attacks have galvanized solidarity in the Vietnamese people. As several 
of the participants noted in their interviews, the respect for hierarchy and the absolute power of 
the Vietnamese government yields civic compliance. With this in mind, one of the participants, 
when discussing Vietnamese society, stated, “In terms of communicable diseases, because it is 
top down, it has its advantages in terms of provisional information and people follow instructions 
and people have access to information in a systematic way. And because of the long history of 
Vietnam having a very good grassroots level and a very community-based mobilization of 
people and resources.” The participant from the Ministry of Health surmised that when ministries 
nationwide were informed of the atypical pneumonia virus and the protocols that were 
recommended by the WHO team, they were enacted swiftly and effectively. He said, “The 
Government was working as a coordinator to request other ministries to get involved to help with 
SARS control. I know that at that time even the media, police and the soldiers were involved. 
The local government informed us on loudspeakers. If you come in contact with a foreigner and 
get sick, report it to the authorities immediately. We mobilized all the society to control SARS.” 
Government directives spurred immediate action, a key feature of the biopolitical 
environment in Vietnam during the SARS outbreak of 2003. Vietnam’s history yields a cultural 
logic of solidarity ubiquitous in society. So much so, iconic propaganda art and war heroes are 
the norm, considered by Malesevic (2011:155) as a routine nationalist narrative. As Barthes and 
Bordier note (Malesevic 2011), solidarity in its routine is rarely questioned; it embeds as the 
historic conscience of society.  
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National solidarity owes much to its organizational and ideological embeddedness. This 
was exemplified during the SARS outbreak, and especially through the results of the participant 
interviews. The politburo acted expeditiously, in hand with the WHO, to contain SARS. Border 
control, patient quarantine, hospital shut down, and the national mobilization of healthcare 
resources were all vetted, then enforced through the communist party. The cultural logics of war 
and solidarity shaped the pathology of SARS containment. 
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CHAPTER 3 
“US” VERSUS “THEM” AND THE RESPONSE TO SARS 
 
3.1 “Us” versus “Them”  
            In Vietnam, the “Us” versus “Them” duality is amplified through the events of the 
American war and the global ostracism that followed. Ostracism is an enforced separation from a 
society or a group, of ‘‘Us’’ from ‘‘Them”. After the defeat of the US and the southern regime of 
Vietnam on April 30, 1975 and the subsequent invasion of Chinese-backed Cambodia in late 
1978, Vietnam was boycotted. Southeast Asian nations readily accepted American proposals to 
shun Vietnam because they feared Vietnamese expansion in the region. Virtually the entire 
Western world joined the boycott (Wallace 1992 LA Times). Vietnam was isolated from the 
West and its closest neighbors, both socially and economically. The new communist regime and 
its people were forced to endure starvation and a halt in development during the globally 
prosperous 1970s and 1980s. In Vietnamese lore, the bamboo thicket that surrounds the villages, 
demarcating “In” from “Out”, or “Us” from “Them”, now surrounded the nation. The language 
in participant interviews reflected the division between Vietnamese citizens and those not from 
Vietnam. For example, foreign experts were spoken of as those from a world free of the strife 
and resulting poverty that Vietnam had endured. They bore a connection to development and 
education in nations unencumbered with the “fight” against foreign aggression. Foreigners or 
overseas Vietnamese were spoken of as from developed countries and not from Vietnam. 
Until recently, Vietnamese citizens could not leave their country due to communist 
emigration policy. Those that left after the American war were cut off from family and their 
homeland. There was a distinct separation of those in Vietnam from those outside, impacting the 
generations immediately following 1975. This sense of separation is evident today with those 
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who remained in Vietnam after the war and those who left, nationally referred to as Viet Kieu, or 
“overseas Vietnamese”. They are treated as outsiders by the Vietnamese government, despite 
their documented ethnic connection to the country. The Viet Kieu are those that left, they are 
distinctly “Them” to Vietnamese that stayed in Vietnam.  
 Foreign nationals have similar rights as Viet Kieu in eyes of the communist government 
of Vietnam. Both Viet Kieu and the Vietnamese phrase for foreigners, Ong/Ba Tay or “Respected 
Westerner” verbally identified these groups as “Them”. Ong and Ba are very formal honorifics 
reserved for respected elders such as grandmothers and grandfathers. Thus although foreign 
nationals are identified verbally as “Them”, they are given the most respectful honorific in the 
Vietnamese language. Tay “Westerner” can also be used in the negative sense as well as in Tay 
Ba Lo “backpacker” with a slightly negative connotation of a person with living day to day 
without life savings or a nuclear family. In professional circles, Ong Tay is used with the utmost 
of respect. The fact that these words of respect for foreigners are embedded in the Vietnamese 
language demonstrates respect for Western foreign nationals in Vietnam and the expertise and 
wealth that they may represent. Language used in participant interviews reflected this reverence. 
French doctors, Dr. Urbani and his WHO colleagues from abroad who entered Vietnam to assist 
in the initial diagnosis and strengthening of infectious disease protocols were spoken of in this 
manner. At the participant interviews organized by the HFH secretary, I too, was accorded this 
honor, even though the participants had to take time out of their work day to take part. 
The Vietnamese perspective of other Asian cultures, especially that of China, constitutes 
another expression of the “Us” versus “Them” dichotomy, as revealed by participant interviews. 
When asked, participants stated that the SARS virus came from those outside Vietnam. The virus 
came from “Them”. Foreigners brought the disease across the border, the disease did not have its 
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origins in Vietnam. Viewing the Chinese as the infected “Them” fits well with in the biopolitics 
and challenging relationship between Vietnam and China. Language from the participant 
interviews reflected Chinese aggression toward Vietnam, something that pervades much of the 
relations between the two Asian neighbors. 
 Currently, China has laid claim to the Spratly Archipelago islands as sovereign territory. 
This has greatly angered the Vietnamese, as the islands are within their territorial waters. 
Vietnam has always believed they have a claim on sovereignty to the Spratly Islands. The much 
more powerful China refers to these waters as the “South China Sea”, while Vietnamese national 
maps defiantly refer to them only as the “East Sea”. The Spratly Archipelago and border 
demarcations on territorial waters are adversarial negotiations between China and Vietnam. 
Armed skirmishes continue to be a regular occurrence at sea, with trade and tourism sometimes 
suffering between the two. The difficulty with its large and powerful neighbor to the North aligns 
with “Us” versus “Them” that pervades contemporary Vietnam’s international relations. The 
SARS pandemic reinforces the dichotomy. It came from beyond the thicket, beyond Vietnam’s 
borders, it came from “Them”. The frontline healthcare workers interviewed for this research 
referred to the index patient as an occidental, and someone of Chinese origin, which is in 
essence, categorizes the index patient as a double “Them”. The index patient, Johnny Chen, was 
an American-Chinese, of Western origin and of Chinese descent. Healthcare workers discussed 
the crisis situation when their colleagues were dying at the onset of the pandemic. HFH medical 
doctors spoke of frantic online research that brought up sporadic reports of an atypical 
pneumonia emanating from China, the adversarial “Them” in Vietnam. Participants discussed 
China as the more powerful nation, the controlling “big brother”, but also as the source of the 
disease state invading Vietnam. 
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In terms of the West, Said (1978) notes that western imperialism constructed ‘the 
Oriental’ (initially the Middle East and later East Asia) as the inferior Other. According to Said, 
the categorization of the ‘Oriental’ as mysterious, intriguing and eccentric, at the same time 
primitive, despotic and cruel, served to justify and advance European imperialism. Healthcare 
workers spoke of the index patient as a Chinese-American businessman, from the developed 
West, entering Vietnam as a diseased guest. He came from outside Vietnam, “beyond the 
bamboo thicket” and precipitated the deaths of their colleagues. The superior occidental was 
infecting Vietnam, in opposition to Said’s primitive “Oriental”. As noted by Liu (2017:801), this 
social construction of ethno-cultural difference between social agents is at play between 
Vietnamese and citizens of the western world. Healthcare workers spoke of the index patient as 
both a Western and a man in a diseased state, coalescing both social constructions of “Us” and 
“Them” and “East” versus “West”. For Vietnam, the division between “Us” and “Them” is 
heightened by a regional and global politics that could only be overcome by the Vietnamese 
admitting their isolation, and promoting the previously mentioned Doi Moi (renewal, opening) 
policy in 1986. Participant discussions reinforced the separation of the Vietnamese “Us” from 
those of the West or “Them”. Vietnam was looking to the developed West for assistance with 
health services during the SARS outbreak. Now the West was infecting Vietnam.  
Due to the sudden onset on SARS and resulting crisis, the Ministry of Health, the HFH, 
and Dr. Urbani were forced to make due with an underfunded healthcare system. As the 
healthcare workers discussed in their participant interviews, the HFH relied on the 19th century 
protocols of quarantine, patient tracing, and isolation wards. Thus, the limited socio-economics 
of Vietnam impacted containment. There was no time to employ Koch’s postulates to categorize 
the virus. In fact, the WHO (2006:30) states that the eventual sequencing of the genome of the 
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SARS CoV played no role in containment. Despite contemporary healthcare’s advancing 
technologies, the WHO (2006:243) states that the number one “Lesson Learned” from the SARS 
pandemic was the value of the techniques of isolation, quarantine, and patient tracing. This broke 
the chain of transmission, and is an important environmental intervention in Singer’s (2016:265) 
unavoidable relationship between humans and mutagenic pathogens. 
One of the participants explained her version of solidarity this way, “Okay culturally, 
there is a popular saying that the bamboo trees in Vietnam are the symbol of Vietnamese 
community strength, and how the Vietnamese people defend ourselves. If you go to the 
countryside in Vietnam, and you can notice the beginning of the village, there will be a line of 
bamboo trees. The trees are the symbol of the barrier to the community inside protected by the 
line of bamboo trees and the outer world.”  
The solidarity in protecting “Us” on the inside of the bamboo thicket involved following 
the rules of quarantine, patient tracing, and protective personal equipment (PPE) protocols, as 
outlined by the WHO. The healthcare workers to a person all stated that they followed these 
rules in solidarity with those that were sickened, to contain the disease in Vietnam. Being that the 
disease was brought inside the country by foreigners, following the quarantine, patient tracing 
and protocols religiously would contain and kill it, saving “Us” on the inside and containing the 
damage brought into Vietnam by “Them”. 
In the microcosm of the HFH in the initial phase of the outbreak, a prominent theme was 
looking to the healthcare practices of the technologically advanced “Them” of the West. The 
HFH staff stated in participant interviews that they looked to the French doctors and Urbani as 
the Italian WHO specialist. They led doctors and technicians in Vietnam who gained firsthand 
experience in dealing with patients that contracted SARS. But just as Said (1978) pointed out, 
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this juxtaposition is a colonial relic that does not always hold true. The deputy director at the 
Hanoi Center for Tropical Diseases felt that he understood the outbreak as well as clinicians 
from the West (Fahlman, Urbani, Scialdone 2003). Doctors at the Tropical Disease Center felt 
that Urbani should not have left for Thailand after contracting SARS, and stood a better chance 
of survival in Vietnam. Although that outcome is unpredictable, there was a perceptible interplay 
between “Us” and “Them” that manifested during the crisis period of the SARS pandemic. 
At an editorial meeting with the Vietnam Economic Times (VET), a national business 
monthly in Vietnam, I was asked to do research for an article on a specific topic related to the 
discussion of “Us” and “Them”. The editorial board asked me to research Vietnamese companies 
to explore whether or not Vietnamese companies more readily accept, and put into use foreign 
expertise as compared to other Asian nations. This was at a time when Vietnam was actively 
seeking foreign investment into the manufacturing sector. But the fact that the article topic was 
requested at a business monthly editorial meeting suggests the Vietnamese see themselves in this 
manner. I was told that compared to Japanese, Korean and even Chinese companies, Vietnamese 
businesses actively pursue and implement foreign expertise and are open-minded to this 
approach. I conducted the research interviews and wrote the article. Many American, Taiwanese, 
and even Canadian multinationals did agree with this assessment. In their experience, more 
Vietnamese businesses aggressively sought and implemented foreign expertise in comparison to 
operations in other Asian nations.  
This parallels with the Vietnamese response to SARS. Participant explained in 
interviews, when Vietnamese healthcare-worker deaths plagued the HFH, staff mobilized to 
fight, but also turned to international expertise. The first doctor involved with the index patient 
explained that the expert at hand was Dr. Olivier Cattin, one of the French doctors on staff at the 
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HFH. She said, “He told me he saw on the WHO website that there was an outbreak of 
pneumonia in Hong Kong. That’s why Olivier Cattin told me to call the WHO and the US 
Embassy because Chen [the index patient for Vietnam] was American.” She stated that when 
they decided to call the WHO, they were put in touch with Dr. Carlo Urbani. She explained her 
relief when he finally showed up to support the HFH. She said he made notes of his careful 
analysis of the situation, and perspectives that they may have missed under the pressure of the 
crisis of healthcare workers becoming ill. In contrast, China’s handling of the SARS virus was 
later revealed to be the opposite of that in Vietnam. As the WHO (2006:73) described it, China 
failed to issue a warning as the virus spread across the country and outside its borders. The 
Chinese Ministry of Health provided little or no information to the foreign experts at the WHO. 
China changed their stance dramatically (WHO 2006:78), allowing unprecedented visas on 
arrival for WHO experts, and developing a reporting framework almost immediately, after 
Vietnam set off global alerts and began releasing all information on the disease through the 
WHO network (Figure 1 pg. 49). SARS reporting is a clear example of how Vietnamese quickly 
utilize foreign expertise and networks. The majority of the healthcare workers who participated 
in this research made mention of their solidarity, but also remarked on the teamwork with 
international specialists, not only with their French counterparts at the HFH, but also Dr. Urbani 
and the GOARN team from the WHO. Participants stated they were keenly aware that this 
international teamwork in the initial phase of the SARS pandemic was vital to containment. 
One of the healthcare participants articulated the Vietnamese cultural logic of “Us” versus 
“Them” clearly through her depiction of the index patient in Vietnam. Upon initial diagnosis, the 
doctor, nurse and admittance staff noticed the foreign patient – Chinese-American businessman 
Johnny Chen – was acting strangely for a foreigner in Vietnam. It was, and is, very unusual for 
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foreign patients in Vietnam to be difficult to handle, but Chen was. In fact, foreigners in 
Vietnamese hospitals are often overtly respectful. The participant explained that Vietnamese 
patients, who must pay in advance to get health services, are difficult and demanding with their 
fellow Vietnamese hospital staff. But the opposite is the case for foreign patients. They are more 
understanding, and are well acquainted with health services. Westerners often have health 
insurance so their healthcare is paid for. In Chen’s case, he was tired and difficult. The virus had 
put him out of sorts and the Vietnamese staff had picked up on this very clearly and discussed it. 
The participant clarified a cultural logic in terms of two different patient types: Vietnamese as the 
difficult and expectant patients, and foreigners as the understanding and thoughtful patients. Of 
course this is not always the case, but since the admittance staff member took time to explain this, 
I took note of her description. 
The participant had a long history of work in healthcare. She formulated her opinion after 
seeing thousands of patients. The nurse, like other healthcare staff, was delineating the cultural 
logics of “Us” – the difficult Vietnamese patient, and the “Them” – the understanding and polite 
Westerner. The American patient exhibited too many unexpected idiosyncrasies and the healthcare 
workers picked up on that and were concerned. The HFH staff, and in turn, Carlo Urbani, had 
deciphered metaphorically that something was terribly wrong with Johnny Chen. His response to 
treatment was abnormal. 
Another participant nurse was also keenly aware of the international specialists as “Them”, 
that were participating in the resistance to the pandemic once the crisis set in. She recounted how 
happy they were to see the Italian specialist, Dr. Carlo Urbani come to their assistance from the 
WHO. Since the WHO was well connected globally to modern healthcare, she felt this assistance 
was critical, calling Urbani, “a thorough, careful doctor.” She remembers the first day she met him 
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and the smiles he exuded upon meeting all of the healthcare staff for the first time. So sensitive 
was she to the emotions of the international specialist that she vividly recounted how the next day, 
when he returned to follow up, the smile was gone. The gestures of emotions sent a wave a fear 
through the healthcare staff. They realized that if the foreign experts were showing deep concern, 
they were facing something very dangerous, an infectious illness that was not yet well understood. 
 
3.2 Cultural Logics 
The deputy director at the HFH stated that Vietnamese solidarity, among staff, 
government and country, was key in SARS containment. Although he acknowledged that the 
French doctors and Urbani had a large measure of influence, he felt that Vietnamese healthcare 
staff were effective partners in containment. The deputy director made note of the fact that he 
was with Urbani on most of his rounds, and was only absent at one or two of Urbani’s visits to 
the HFH on behalf of the WHO. Whatever the combination of Vietnamese and foreign expertise, 
after the migration of SARS from China to Vietnam, the end result was containment, and 
heightened global surveillance. Containment was accomplished in Vietnam only after monitoring 
and intervention in this migration of potential SARS carriers. The movement of infected travelers 
and their migration are a representation of Singer’s (2016:265) pathological and social 
construction of SARS.  
Several of the participants noted that innovation was a key cultural logic in Vietnam’s 
response to SARS, a disease the WHO (2006:vii) described as the first emerging, readily 
transmissible and deadly disease of the 21st century. Crisis drives problem solving. Although 
Vietnam at the time lacked the Biosafety Level 3 laboratories needed to handle the contagious 
virus, healthcare staff stated that crisis drove the exploration of alternative approaches. The 
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SARS virus caused airspace edema, the lungs fill with fluid in a single afternoon, which 
intervenes in lung capacity and function, causing death. The biomedical approach was to use 
laboratory technology to discover the virus agent and work backward to find a cure for that 
agent. Healthcare staff stated that there wasn’t time for this approach. Vietnamese doctors at 
Hanoi’s Institute for Tropical Diseases innovated by using mechanical ventilators to keep the 
lungs moving despite the fluid buildup, extending the lives of many SARS patients. When 
doctors at the HFH discovered that the closed air-conditioning ventilation system in their modern 
hospital was circulating the virus, they turned it off, opened the windows and began isolation, 
quarantine and patient tracing. Air system and window ventilation checks are now part of 
WHO’s regimen of disease response protocols. As Omi WHO (2006:vii) stated, Vietnam led the 
way. Without the technologically advanced approach of developed nations, the Vietnamese were 
using 19th century protocols to stem a 21st century disease. Several staff revealed that Vietnam’s 
innovative nature has its roots in Vietnam’s history of war and isolationism. Generations at battle 
created a breeding ground ripe for the novel trajectory of innovation. Nothing was known about 
the SARS virus in its initial diagnosis. The first thing that Vietnam’s medical community knew 
about SARS was that it killed healthcare workers. These alarming deaths provided the crisis that 
drove rapid and innovative solutions within Vietnam’s means. 
The SARS pandemic served to unite health ministries and labs from around the world 
who had never worked together before, culminating ultimately in the intervention of the SARS 
pandemic and eventually its genome sequencing. An unprecedented unification of countries, 
cutting across huge sociocultural differences brought together labs and researchers from around 
the world toward containment. Vietnam led the way, acts of solidarity and innovation mentioned 
in my participant interviews were, at the time of the outbreak, reported on through the WHO 
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network. They influenced the unity of the global response. Researchers around the globe were 
inspired by the original Vietnamese healthcare workers that had agreed to live at the HFH during 
the critical stabilization phase of the pandemic.   
3.3 Galvanized Response   
To illustrate a country-comparison of progress combatting the SARS pandemic in 
Vietnam, I utilize the WHO (2006:3) SARS chronology in Figure 1, page 49.  I present China as 
the counter-example to contrast a separate set of challenges to the SARS response. The annexing 
of Vietnam from the West reinforces the Southeast Asian nation’s historic conscience with a 
strong sense of “Us” versus “Them”. A communist nation annexed from the rest of the world 
from the end of the American War, April 30, 1975 to the reopening of the American and 
Canadian embassies in 1995, Vietnam has developed on its own trajectory, as a socialist-based 
market economy. Participant interviews revealed consistent themes of “solidarity” towards one’s 
country, the “innovation” to “fight” the intruding virus, and a great respect for “foreign 
expertise”. These cultural logics were galvanized and leveraged during Vietnam’s SARS 
response. One of the admittance nurses on the frontlines was quite vocal in this regard. “We 
needed to work very close together, the team was strong and solid more than ever. [The crisis] 
made us feel the need to stay and help colleagues. If we were on the work roster tomorrow, 
maybe we become a patient [in that time]”. She went on further to say, “We are, many years 
during the war hardworking, people that stay together to fight against [the enemy]. When we 
have a problem, we stay together and fight it. To run away is not good. We know that two nurses 
passed away without time to talk to family. We learned from them and wrote letters to family. If 
something were to happen to me, my friend would deliver the letter”. Another nurse, bedridden 
and awakening from coma confided, “They came to help, they came from France, with blue eyes 
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and blond hair. And I thought, oh this is very lucky, they came to help. And I thought, do not be 
afraid.” So respectful were the Vietnamese healthcare workers of their expert French 
counterparts, the deputy director of the HFH, when trying to convince the Ministry of Health of 
the serious nature of the atypical virus stated, “I asked them, if they don’t help us, I think a lot of 
people will die. For example, if our French doctors die here, what do you we do?” It seems the 
deputy director is positioning a foreign doctor’s death in Vietnam as a worst case scenario, even 
worse than Vietnamese healthcare workers dying! 
The fight against SARS was led in part by Vietnamese doctors and healthcare workers at 
the HFH, French doctors on staff, and Dr. Carlo Urbani from the WHO. In order to support this, 
I refer to Figure 1, with information gleaned from the WHO’s SARS Chronology (WHO 2006:3-
49) as follows: 
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Table 3. 1: Chronology of SARS response in Vietnam and in China (WHO 2006:3-49). 
 
  
VIET NAM 
 
CHINA 
 
- DISEASE ONSET – critical need for int’l transparency 
- PROGRESS TOWARDS CONTAINMENT 
- DISEASE CONTAINMENT 
 
16 NOVEMBER 2002 China: A 45-year-old man in Foshan City, 
Guangdong, becomes ill with fever and respiratory symptoms, and 
passes on the infection to four relatives. He is retrospectively 
identified as the first SARS case. 
 
21 FEBRUARY 2003 Viet Nam:  Index case arrives to HFH Hanoi 
from China. WHO offices notified the next morning, advice sought. 
 
12 FEBRUARY 2003 China:  WHO receives emails, media reports of 
deadly virus in Guangdong, but receives no response from the Chinese 
Ministry of Health. 
 
3 MARCH 2003 Viet Nam: Dr Urbani examines Hanoi index case, 
sends a report to WHO’s Regional Office, emphasizes the need for 
strict infection controls. 
 
17 FEBRUARY 2003 China: No response from the Ministry of 
Health, despite WHO’s request and offer of assistance. 
 
9 MARCH 2003 Viet Nam: Twelve Hanoi-French Hospital staff 
hospitalized. The WHO writes to the Ministry of Health and HFH, 
urging them to control the outbreak. Carlo Urbani meets with Ministry 
of Health. The next day, Vietnam is locked down and on high alert. 
 
20 FEBRUARY 2003 China:  The WHO’s Regional Director calls the 
Ministry of Health to request permission for team investigation. China 
demands a Terms of Reference to cooperate.  
 
14 MARCH 2003 Viet Nam: The WHO team, mobilized through 
GOARN, starts arriving. 
 
24 FEBRUARY 2003 China: Limited cooperation with WHO in 
Beijing only. 
 
19 APRIL 2003 Viet Nam: No new cases. The 1,130-kilometre border 
with China, officials say, may be closed to prevent the risk of 
importation. 
 
3 MARCH 2003 China: The WHO team begins discussing 
Guangdong outbreaks with China’s Ministry of Health. Ground zero of 
SARS outbreak 
 
28 APRIL 2003 Viet Nam: First country to contain SARS, as WHO 
removes Viet Nam from its list of affected areas (the last case was 
isolated on 7 April). 
 
10 MARCH 2003 China: The WHO team informs the Ministry about 
the Hanoi outbreak, connection to the index case who traveled from 
Hong Kong. Cooperation increases. 
 
 
 
26 MARCH 2003 China The WHO team concludes Guangdong 
outbreak of 
“atypical pneumonia” was SARS, and the origin of the multi-country 
outbreak. 
 
 
 
 
 
23 MAY 2003 China: WHO removes its travel advisory for Hong 
Kong and Guangdong Province, which have successfully contained 
their outbreaks. 
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Table 3.1 represents empirical evidence from the WHO that SARS originated and spread 
throughout China unchecked for four months, from November 16, 2002 to February 26, 2003. 
The atypical virus was only outed to the global health community after an infected traveler left 
China for Hanoi. In contrast, the Vietnamese initiated international cooperation with the WHO 
only hours after the infected traveler was diagnosed. The relay of information through the global 
network in Vietnam proved vital in saving lives. Figure 1 parallels the position taken by 
participants during interviews, of Vietnam’s tendency toward rapid acceptance of international 
expertise and facilitation of international cooperation. Clearly, Vietnam’s cultural logics were 
not the only reason for the Southeast Asian nation’s successful containment, but the outward 
looking trend for collaboration played a central role. The leveraging of these cultural logics was 
nuanced, but progressive toward SARS containment in Vietnam. This critical aspect of 
Vietnam’s SARS response demonstrates the necessitation of transparency during the crisis of 
pandemic response. This transparency ensures that the whole of the international healthcare 
community’s repertoire of response mechanisms can be utilized to mitigate Singer’s (2016:265) 
future for humanity shared with significant mutagenic pathogens. 
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CHAPTER 4 
POWER, BIOPOWER, AND BIOPOLITICS 
4.1 Power and Vietnam 
 This chapter is dedicated to the analysis of power as it pertains to biopower and 
biopolitics during the SARS outbreak of 2003 in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Foucault 
(1980:141) notes that power is omnipresent in all social interactions, one is never outside it. He 
envisages power on two levels. The first is the empirical, a historic look at the state and its 
citizens as part of sovereign power. The second level is the theoretical, or the discursive chain of 
force relations in systems of power that exist in all social interactions. The empirical level, as the 
word identifies, considers a specific sovereign entity. For this research, we consider the 
communist government of Vietnam. The theoretical level is not specific. It transcends time 
across periods and epochs. For the purposes of this research I touch on the empirical, but employ 
Foucault’s theoretical level of power “analytics” across time. I explore the power relationship 
and force relations among Vietnamese citizens, foreigners, healthcare workers, the Ministry of 
Health, and the state of Vietnam during the SARS pandemic of 2003. 
In an empirical analysis of power, there is a pyramid of relations. In Vietnam, for 
example, the General Secretary of the Communist Party is the most powerful person in the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam. The General Secretary presides over the work of the Central 
Committee, the Politburo, the Secretariat, and holds the post of Secretary of the Central Military 
Commission, the party's highest military position. The national congress and the ministries 
administrate below these government bodies, controlling the Ministry of Health in Vietnam. The 
people of Vietnam occupy the bottom of this pyramid. From this research, the citizens, in this 
case, the healthcare workers, influenced government. Participant interviews revealed that the 
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coordinated and unified efforts of the healthcare workers and the directorship of the hospital 
were able to influence the government of Vietnam toward containment once they realized the 
dangers of the atypical influence that was killing their colleagues. 
Foucault (1994:12) sees resistance as integral to power relations. If there were no 
possibility of resistance – of violent resistance, of escape, of ruse, of strategies that reverse the 
situation – there would be no relations of power. The SARS pandemic in Vietnam pitted the 
healthcare community, in Vietnam’s biopolitical milieu, against the atypical pneumonia. Public 
health stood in the balance. As Taylor (2011:25) suggests, these force relations are processes, not 
static, and are constantly being transformed. These transformations represent endless struggle 
and confrontation between the original forces and its resistance. Participant interviews revealed 
the fierce battle to prevent the death of more healthcare workers in competing power relations 
between the HFH, the WHO, and the central government in controlling SARS. This process 
produces tactile or local forces which gather in support or resistance to form much larger systems 
that constitute “institutional crystallizations”. These then become terminal and recognizable 
forms such as the State.  Noticeable is the move from the micro-level to the macro, from the 
molecular to the everyday. As doctors and nurses worked together in defiance to contain the 
virus, support was required from the Ministry of Health and the central government of Vietnam. 
As healthcare workers united to call in international forces and lobby the government, 
institutions were motivated and mobilized toward virus containment. As the deputy director 
stated, the HFH was small and united, galvanizing staff and lobbying the Ministry of Health for 
assistance as a unified team, that included their foreign specialists, and those from the WHO. He 
stated that public hospitals would have been too bureaucratic to act quickly, and be open to 
foreign assistance and cooperation. The power dynamic for the small, private HFH favored quick 
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and decisive action. Individual force relations through their processes of transformation become 
networks or systems; producing larger, strategic manifestations in the form of laws. These 
actions resulted in clear explanations to the Ministry of Health and the central government and 
caused the rapid closure of hospitals, hotels, and borders, isolating and quarantining the virus to 
help establish control of the pandemic.  
According to Foucault’s description, power is not only top down. Power relations exist 
throughout the pyramid, expressed at each level. Foucault expands the notion of power as a 
much fuller understanding than the archetypal top-down view. Power arises from the people of 
Vietnam at the bottom. Thus, when healthcare workers at the HFH, representatives at the WHO, 
and the Ministry of Health have sufficiently made their case towards the Politburo – as was the 
case of the SARS pandemic – decisions thereafter come right from the top. National mobilization 
under direction from the singular and powerful communist party means immediate action is 
coordinated and follows quickly after decisions come down. Accordingly, in the participant 
interview with the hospital’s deputy director, the participant made this relationship quite clear. 
As stated, The HFH, The WHO and Dr. Carlo Urbani manipulated this power dynamic. They 
insisted on a meeting with the Ministry of Health on March 9, 2003. Healthcare workers had 
succumbed to SARS and there were no answers for the atypical virus infections. If they could tip 
the power dynamic with the Ministry of Health up to the Politburo, they could then influence the 
top leadership of the country. The resulting influence of decisions from the top down would 
secure national mobilization and border security. Shortly after the March 9 meeting, Vietnam’s 
leadership initiated a complete lockdown of all areas of the outbreak and well as border controls 
and traveler screening procedures. 
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Indeed, Foucault (1982:777) states the primary driving interest of all his research is the 
“subject”; how people and institutions strategize to situate themselves as subjects. Force 
relations, very broadly, consist of whatever is in one's social interactions that pushes, urges or 
compels one to do something. This can be characterized as a “network” of force relations 
throughout society. A description of power is not absolute, as power does not allow one to 
understand everything about social interactions. But power should be viewed as understanding 
the strategy of positioning oneself. Power can be used as an “analytic” to understand social 
interactions and predict outcomes. Foucault (1990:82) works toward an 'analytics' of power: that 
is, toward a definition of the specific domain formed by relations of power, and toward a 
determination of the instruments that will make possible its analysis. Social interactions are 
constantly permeated by these relations of force, power relations. Foucault (1990:93) thus 
describes force relations as a "substrate”: it is the moving substrate of force relations which, by 
virtue of their inequality constantly engender states of power, but the latter are always local and 
unstable. As the deputy director of the HFH stated, his private hospital did not fit into the power 
dynamic of the public system, guided directly by the Ministry of Health. As a private hospital 
outside of the state-controlled milieu, HFH had sent several requests to the Ministry of Health for 
assistance during the initial phase of the SARS crisis. As he said, had it been a request from a 
state-owned hospital, relying on the bureaucratic power relations between state-owned facility 
and the Ministry of Health, the response would have been muted. But because of the French 
ownership and integration into global healthcare, there was a perceived autonomy to the private 
hospital operating in Vietnam and a much different dynamic to power relations between the two. 
The deputy director also stated that the fact that the hospital was smaller than the sprawling 
stated-owned hospitals, such as the Bach Mai hospital nearby, the power relations and solidarity 
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among the relatively small number of staff was very high. When healthcare-worker deaths began 
to occur, the balance of surviving staff banded together rapidly to counter the crisis head on. All 
of the participants from the HFH made special note of this to me, referring to it as the 
“backbone” of the HFH response. Several stated that there was nowhere else to turn, while 
colleagues were dying, so they stuck together under the immense pressure to contain the 
pandemic, for the good of their fellow man and the country. 
4.2 Biopower 
 Two modern forms of power are disciplinary power and biopower. Biopower is power 
over bios, or power over life. Disciplinary power is the micro-technology and biopolitics is the 
macro-technology of the same power over life. Foucault (1982:778) refers to biopower as the art 
of government, realized through biopolitical control of public institutions and public health. 
Disciplinary power includes laws exuded over the individual while biopower functions through 
societal norms rather than laws. Biopower is also internalized by subjects rather than only 
exercised from above. Further, Foucault (1990:138) states biopower takes hold of human life, a 
shift from sovereign power’s “right of life and death” to a “control over life”. Foucault’s 
discussion of government control of healthcare workers and the public as “subjects” of disease is 
relevant here.  
Biopower is dispersed throughout society rather than located in a single individual or 
government body. The focus is diverted from the individual to the population, although a duality 
exists in the individual that makes up the group or population. Biopower forms on two basic 
levels, one is the power over the individual life, or anatomopolitics. During the SARS pandemic 
in Vietnam, the HFH and the WHO sequestered healthcare workers to remain at the hospital 
under the guidance of the Ministry of Health.  Those that had left since the outbreak were 
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required to return to the HFH. This governing over individual lives worked to track the virus and 
contain the pandemic. The power over a group of lives, or a population, is the other, termed 
biopolitics. Closing borders and traveler screening, and other measures of guidance for the public 
regulated population flows and allowed monitoring of all who exited and entered the Vietnam 
during the SARS pandemic.  
TABLE 4.1 A Schematization of the Two Levels of Biopower 
 
Type Target Aim Institutions Tactics 
Regulatory power 
(biopolitics) 
Populations, 
species, race 
Knowledge/power, 
control of the 
population 
The state Studies and practices of 
demographers, sociologists, 
economists; interventions in the 
birthrate, longevity, 
public health, housing, 
migration 
 
Disciplinary power  
(anatomopolitics) 
Individuals, 
bodies 
Knowledge/ power 
and subjugation of 
bodies 
Schools, armies, 
prisons, asylums, 
hospitals, workshops 
Studies and practices 
of criminologists, 
psychologists, 
psychiatrists, educators; 
apprenticeship, tests, 
education, training 
 
 
 As Foucault (2003:248-9) notes, we now have the power to keep people alive 
when they should be dead and to decide when to "let them die”, or to regulate their lives even 
after, biologically speaking, they should be dead. Modern states have gained a biopolitical 
interest in fostering life, and state enactments of biopower are termed biopolitics. As Foucault 
(1990:139) states, population supervision is effected through an entire series of interventions and 
regulatory controls: a biopolitics of the population. SARS became a biopolitical concern for 
public health in Vietnam during the pandemic of 2003 after the index case for SARS flew on a 
business trip from Hong Kong, China to Hanoi, Vietnam. The index case made his way through 
the Ho Lu border crossing corridor from the mainland to Hong Kong, and then onto Vietnam. 
His arrival spread SARS among healthcare workers at the HFH. The pandemic necessitated 
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biopolitical action toward intervention and containment. Stakeholders included the central 
government of Vietnam, the Ministry of Health, the WHO and Dr. Carlo Urbani as their 
representative, citizens and expatriates, as well as the healthcare workers at the HFH.  
  The admitting doctor for the index patient explained how the HFH was shaken by 
the sick and dying healthcare workers. “We had to be very solid and very close because we had 
to fight the enemy, the SARS virus, to uh, win the enemy.” Vietnamese and French staff 
scrambled to deal with the initial swell of illnesses surrounding the index case. As she explained, 
the HFH sensed they were losing control of the situation and first searched the internet for 
information. Hospitals are a place where citizens find respite from pandemics, but in this unusual 
case, the hospital was the source of the pandemic.  
Power relations existed among the WHO as the global authority for disease, the private 
HFH, Vietnam’s Ministry of Health, and the central government of Vietnam. Control of the 
country and the balance of power sits with the central government and the Vietnamese politburo. 
The only way to influence the politburo was through the Vietnamese Ministry of Health. Urbani 
and his WHO colleagues understood that they were considered ‘guests’ in Vietnam. Since they 
were a foreign organization with no status within the communist government, they had limited 
power to influence the situation in Vietnam. Their power to intervene in the path of the pandemic 
involved persuading the Ministry of Health of the dangers of SARS. If the Ministry of Health 
was convinced, they, in turn, would influence the politburo. As history dictates, this is precisely 
what happened. Urbani and his team met with the Ministry of Health on March 9th, 2003 and 
explained the seriousness of the situation, shifting the biopolitical state in Vietnam toward lock 
down and containment. 
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The politburo, the central seat of power in the Vietnamese central government then issued 
biopolitical directives down through the Ministry of Health that controls all hospital in Vietnam. 
The politburo also issued directives to the military and police who control the country’s borders. 
This led to a domino effect. The state’s biopolitical decisions perpetuated a series of 
interventions and regulatory controls to restore and protect the health of the population. These 
directives included the closure the HFH, the closure of the hotel where the index patient had 
resided, tightened border security, and signaled the WHO to begin global alerts through their 
network. The national mobilization that followed was typical of communist nations, a zero-sum 
result put into effect within hours. Patient tracing, isolation and quarantine that were already in 
effect were strengthened by directives from the Ministry of Health.  
From Urbani’s focus on the individual index case, the focus shifted to the population as a 
whole, and indeed the global population, by influencing the Ministry of Health. Directives 
reached the ministerial level and are disseminated, publicized and practiced by all citizens. The 
state was concerned with guiding and administering the norms of the population as a whole, and 
thus concerned with understanding and regulating public health. As the WHO (2006:247) states, 
it was this biopolitical environment that set the stage for Vietnam to lock down and speed 
containment of the invading virus. The WHO reported this successful approach to other countries 
dealing with the outbreak. According to the WHO (2006:247), possibly the greatest triumph 
from the SARS experience was how fiercely and well national governments and international 
public health institutions labored together for six months to control the outbreaks. Biopolitical 
events in each of the member states and coordination of this aspect, in retrospect, was, and is 
unprecedented today. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
Direct engagement with research participants allows us to see reality from the eyes of the 
actor and to grasp the meaning of their action; “it is to unravel and understand the world from the 
perspective of the acting persons situated in their own local context and therefore, understanding 
the society in which they live” (Chevrier 2014:25). Those that took part in this research were at 
the center of Vietnam’s biopolitically charged, and culturally nuanced response to SARS 
pandemic of 2003. The infectious disease went unchecked in China. But when one of the 
infected travelers flew to Vietnam for business, his infection spread among these very healthcare 
workers, who were dying. They were faced with diagnosing and containing the atypical and 
infectious virus. This research captures a snapshot of the pandemic, from ten participants of 
Vietnam’s biopolitical and sociocultural environment during the communist government’s 
response to the SARS pandemic of 2003. The process has revealed that infectious diseases are a 
part of our complex and intertwined biological, environmental and social worlds. For Vietnam, 
SARS was a biosocial and biopolitical phenomenon, as well as biomedical event. This is 
important as it was biopolitical and biosocial intervention, coupled with the biomedical 
intervention, that allowed Vietnam to become the first of many infected countries to contain the 
virus. To think about infectious disease as purely a biological event ignores far more than it 
considers. Who gets infected, and where and how the infection is spread depends on social 
systems, biopolitics, and the environment.  
If Singer (2016:265) is correct, then virus-borne zoonotic events such as SARS, MERS, 
Avian Influenza and Ebola suggest the future of humankind will be shared with significant 
pathogens. The evolution of these pathogens and the zoonotic jumps of animal diseases to 
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humans is evolving in tune with the human biological system. These deadly pathogenic events 
are happening more frequently with time. This research captures biopolitical, environmental and 
sociocultural facets of the successful response to SARS in Vietnam, mediated outside the 
biomedical realm.  
To date, there has been no ethnographic research directly on the SARS outbreak of 2003 
in Vietnam, although there have been a handful of studies that are somewhat related to it. 
McClelland (2004) did a comparative research analysis of public health strategies associated 
with the SARS response in several countries, including Vietnam. Porter (2013) conducted an 
ethnographic dissertation covering H1N1 avian influenza in Vietnam. While there has been 
plenty of research into the science of the SARS pandemic, the exploration of qualitative research 
into the anthropology of SARS remains limited. 
 Conducting qualitative research in a communist country comes with a unique set of 
challenges. Information is not typically shared freely in such biopolitical environments for fear 
of reprisal. Getting participants to share information with a foreign researcher can best be 
described as, “out of the norm”. During this research, information was provided only after I 
received top-level approval from the director of the Hanoi French Hospital. This had far more to 
do with who I knew rather than what I was researching, or the aim of the research. It was through 
a well-connected gentleman who hosted my internship in Vietnam in 2000, that I received an 
introduction to the hospital fifteen years later. Once the director at the top gave approval, others 
at the Hanoi French Hospital took part in the interview process. 
During the participant interview process and although I was familiar with Vietnam, I 
encountered a cultural and language barrier. For the most part, participants were fluent in 
English, or I used my limited Vietnamese to translate their responses. But I could not account for 
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what part of the interview data that was lost in translation. With the research limited to Vietnam, 
I could not broaden the scope of the analysis to multiple countries. I am, however, confident that 
the research data hit on the strongest themes that crossed multiple storylines, substantiated by the 
participants from Vietnam.  
The data for this research was collected in October of 2015 while the actual events of the 
SARS pandemic in Vietnam took place in February through April of 2003. Timeframes of 
occurrence and recollection of events were subject to capacity of human memory. Participant 
responses during the interview process of this research did not allow me to go beyond their 
personal experience as they dealt with the pandemic from their specific post in the healthcare 
community, media, or Ministry of Health. I was unable to speak to high-level government 
officials that were decision-makers at that time. Perhaps further research into the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam’s high-level government response could widen the scope of understanding 
of the biopolitical climate for pandemic response strategies. 
As I was conducting research for this thesis, I had the chance to do a video log near the 
site of the original SARS outbreak while working in Shenzhen of Guangdong province. When I 
watched the film I had taken, I was struck by the sheer amount of people walking the corridor 
between Guangdong province of mainland China and Hong Kong. The train stations from the 
mainland all link up with the metro system in Hong Kong at this terminal. I also walked and 
bussed across the border. The area is the site of a massive shopping and eating district in 
Shenzhen called Ho Lu. It is the busiest border crossing in the world. By the numbers, 100 
million people cross this border each year. But in the ominous nature of its size lies the perfect 
conduit for disease, with thousands of travelers each day. SARS took this route out of China. 
From the countryside to Shenzhen, and then Hong Kong. From fruit bats that were the reservoir 
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for virus in the wild, to the wet markets for civet cats and other wild game in Guangdong 
province, the SARS virus moved on to the rest of the world. It is these types of massively used 
“bottleneck” travel spaces that could be the site of future research in terms of global migration, 
and must remain under global surveillance.  As the WHO (2006:74) states, Guangdong had 
already invited special attention from WHO disease-control experts because of the crowded 
nature of life there, and because of concerns about avian influenza. Along with SARS, these viral 
agents are the biological cause of disease. But this research reveals that it is the crowded 
walkways and corridors, cramped seating of public transport, and many other social and 
environmental factors that enable disease propagation. 
For example, affordable air travel means more citizens move vast distances in a short 
amount of time. As Omi states (WHO 2006:vii), without air travel, SARS may have remained a 
local problem. SARS broke out in November 2002 – February of 2003, just as winter weather 
around the world causes cold and flu symptoms. These are the same symptoms of SARS. 
Boarding a plane headed to another continent means these symptoms appear normal, while 
taking your seat in close contact with hundreds of passengers and crew. Thus SARS originated in 
China, but within hours, air travel allowed the pathogen to move well beyond its borders. The 
hardest hit countries include Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Singapore, the USA, 
Germany, Ireland, and Canada. Once a carrier reaches the other side of the world, SARS 
symptoms akin to cold and flu quickly manifest, causing human lungs to fill with fluid in a few 
hours, with deadly effect. SARS has a ten-day latency period, and is spread through respiratory 
droplets. The close contact of air travel is the perfect environmental agent to allow for its spread.  
It is interesting to note that the SARS response in Vietnam, a developing nation, fell back 
to isolation and quarantine wards, as well as patient tracing to track those who came in contact 
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with SARS patients. This is both a social and environmental intervention. As participants 
explained and this research revealed, it did not take a multimillion dollar lab or a high tech 
research center to intervene in the viral path. Vietnam did not have either of those. Patient tracing 
is essentially a social record of the disease path, which is an extremely valuable piece of 
information toward containment. It also happens to be a key feature of communist countries. 
Police and government are actively involved in household affairs. Housing residency permits log 
who lives in each dwelling and are meticulously kept by neighborhood police and neighborhood 
commune leaders. People live much closer and communicate more regularly than western 
societies. Citizens’ knowledge of neighborhood affairs is high. This provides much social 
information that can be utilized in times of pandemic response. This was clearly recorded as part 
of Vietnam’s SARS response, a social aspect that when coupled with the biomedical, proved 
prominent in stopping the spread of the SARS virus. As one of the index patient’s admittance 
nurses stated in her interview, “Something was strange, very strange. Because we don’t have 
one, two, three or four nurses sick at the same time with the same symptoms. We conducted the 
routine check for everything and then all nurses who had become sick were informed that they 
must come back to the hospital to have a checkup.” 
Another participant interview revealed that when the nurse fell too ill for her next shift, 
alarm bells went off in her surrounding community. The HFH “required” her to return to work 
and provide exact details on who she had been in contact with. She complained of being tired 
and constantly in need of sleep, or waking up with headaches and cold and flu symptoms. She 
returned to work only to fall ill with SARS, bed ridden and unconscious for a full month. One 
striking feature of her story was that her normal herbal steam and supplements which usually 
soothed her cold and flu symptoms, in this case, had no effect. She explained that that was very 
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unusual for her. Someone this sick in a non-communist country would not have returned to work 
but would rather have entered the local healthcare system, infecting a new wave of healthcare 
workers. This represents yet another biopolitical and social intervention that played a key role in 
containment. Loyalty to her work place, further action by the government and the police, as well 
as the close link between work and daily life are features of Vietnamese society that played a 
role in containment. 
Participant interviews also revealed unwavering loyalty to the work place. Staff with 
young children were allowed to return to their families if they passed health examinations. That 
hospital staff remained at work for this extended period of time characterizes a unique level of 
solidarity, a commendable dedication to vocation and country. I suspect this is not possible in a 
developed nation, suggesting there is a lot to learn from Vietnam and the way healthcare workers 
fell in line for the betterment of the public good. It is my belief that willing worker solidarity and 
the state requirement to stay at work can co-exist. 
I vividly remember the first information I received on SARS while living and working in 
Hanoi. In retrospect, it went from innocent to ominous. I read a photocopied note on a workplace 
bulletin board at an international school. It was dated February 26, 2003, and warned all 
expatriates living in Hanoi that there was a dangerous and highly infectious disease within the 
healthcare community. The Hanoi French Hospital was the most advanced of its kind in 
Vietnam, and all expatriates used this hospital as it accepted foreign health insurance cards. The 
note said it had been closed due to the deadly outbreak. Essentially, we were cut off from our 
recommended healthcare institution. In the vacuum of available news in Vietnam, a bulletin 
board informed of impending doom. Vietnam’s system of megaphone speakers mounted on 
electrical poles broadcast updates we were told, but the updates were in Vietnamese. From what 
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we understood, the updates were keeping society safe with the latest reports. State control of 
media releases were translated to the English daily news but were muted and redacted at best. 
What we did not know was that the communist nation was locking itself down, and we would all 
benefit from this heightened level of security, well beyond our knowledge and perception. We 
were, in a sense, Foucault’s “subjects of power”, as Rabinow (1984:17) states.  
With the contributions and limitations of this research in mind, future research could 
include interviews with more influential government decision makers, as well as those in global 
healthcare agencies like the WHO. This type of research could form an “official” record for 
future countries to benefit from the SARS pandemic response in Vietnam. The fight against 
future pandemics could profit from research into the benefits of international cooperation and 
transparency, as the Socialist Republic of Vietnam so clearly demonstrated through robust 
engagement with the WHO and other global stakeholders. This research focused on Vietnam, but 
future areas for ethnographic study could include multinational participation to provide 
perspectives that cross various cultural divides. McClelland’s (2004) comparative research 
analysis of public health strategies in China, Canada, Singapore, Vietnam, and the United States 
was conducted primarily through document research. But moving further afield, ethnographies in 
those countries would yield a robust biopolitical and socioculturally sensitive global pandemic 
strategy. It would be interesting to chronical a specific set of health determinants that cross 
several cultures, to yield useful information to combat future pandemics. 
In hindsight, and after nearly two decades living and working in Vietnam, I have received 
plenty of assistance and learned a great deal from my Vietnamese colleagues. It is my hope that 
this ethnographic study of the SARS outbreak in Vietnam reveals the critical importance of the 
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sociocultural and biopolitical dimensions of pandemic response, and the potential to validate the 
contributions of developing nations to global healthcare.  
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APPENDIX 
Interview Guide for SARS outbreak February-March 2003 Hanoi, Vietnam 
Explanations: to the questions are in bold, not to be spoken at interview. 
Lighter Font: Questions and prompts 
A. For each participant: 
1. Were you in Hanoi during the SARS outbreak of 2003? 
[Participant is Vietnamese and from Hanoi (2003), then interview continue as these are the 
primary informants for the category and research]. 
2. Where do you think SARS came from? 
B. Initial questions followed by grand tour questions: 
1. Can you describe what it was like during the SARS outbreak in Hanoi in 2003? 
2. What if anything did the government and the media inform you about SARS? 
3. What did you do during the outbreak?  
4. What were the government controls instituted during the height of the outbreak? 
5. What do you know about Carlo Urbani? 
6. How did your organization handle its staff during the outbreak?  
7. Why do you think Vietnam was the first country to contain the SARS virus?  
8. What is it in Vietnam’s history that might have well equipped the country to handle the 
SARS outbreak? 
As stated, the participant interview was an iterative process and the above proved only to be a 
guideline to more substantive questions to dig deeper and access richer information. 
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